A Sea in Flames - Carl Safina [11]
Testing. More complications: when wells lose drilling fluid—as this one did weeks earlier—one possible solution is to send down a special mixture of fluids to block the problem zones in the well bore. Think of the stuff made to spray into a flat tire to seal it enough to get you home. A batch of this mixture is called a “kill pill.” It is a thick, heavy compound (16 pounds per gallon, compared to 14.5 for drilling fluid and 8.6 for seawater).
Two weeks before the accident, when the rig had its serious 3,000-barrel loss of drilling fluid, the fluid specialists made up a kill pill and pumped it down to the problem zone. It didn’t seem to work, so they mixed up another batch: 424 barrels of a combination of two materials. But just as they were preparing to send this second kill pill down the hole, the losses stopped.
They now had a thick, unused 424-barrel kill pill sitting in an extra tank, taking up space on the rig. To dispose of it they had two options: take it onto shore and treat it as hazardous waste or use it in the drilling process. The second choice would allow them to skirt the land-based disposal process and dump the compound directly into the ocean.
The drilling fluid specialists got the bright idea of using the unused kill-pill material in a “spacer.” A spacer is a distinct fluid placed in between two other fluids. When you’re pushing different fluids down a well, you’ll often decide to use a spacer between the different fluids—between displacement fluid and drilling fluid, for instance—so that they won’t mix and so you can keep track of where things are. A spacer also creates a marker in the drilling flow, which allows the rig team to watch the fluid returns, to ensure that flow in equals flow out.
Because BP didn’t want to have to dispose of the thick kill-pill material, they mixed it with some other fluid to create a spacer. BP’s vice president for safety and operations, Mark Bly, later said that using such a mixture was “not an uncommon thing to do.” The rig’s drilling fluid specialist, Leo Lindner, put it differently, saying, “It’s not something that we’ve ever done before.” At a government hearing in August, BP manager David Sims was asked if he had ever used a similar mixture as a spacer. “No, I have not,” Sims said.
Down the hatch it goes. Just like that.
Q: “What if you hadn’t used it that way, what would the rig have had to do; hazardous waste disposal, right?”
Lindner: “Yes.”
Q: “When these pills are mixed, have you ever heard anybody characterize it as looking like snot?”
Lindner: “It wasn’t quite snotty.”
Q: “But it was close?”
Lindner: “It was thick. It was thick, but it was still fluid.”
Q: “So it was very viscous?”
Lindner: “Yes.”
Q: “And really the only reason for putting those two pills down there was just to get rid of them; is that your understanding?”
Lindner: “To my knowledge—well, it filled a function that we needed a spacer.”
Chief engineer Steve Bertone later recalled that after the explosion, “I looked down at the deck because it was very slick and I saw a substance that had a consistency of snot. I can remember thinking to myself, ‘Why is all this snot on the deck?’ ”
Back on the rig, Transocean installation manager Jimmy Harrell outlines the well-closing procedure. BP’s company man (later testimony is conflicting as to whether Kaluza or Vidrine was speaking) suddenly perks up. Interrupts. Says, “Well, my process is different. And I think we’re gonna do it this way.” Chief mechanic Douglas Brown will later testify that BP’s company man said, “This is how it’s going to be,” leading to a verbal “skirmish” with Transocean’s Jimmy Harrell, who left the meeting grumbling, “I guess that’s what we have those pincers for” (referring to the blowout preventer). Harrell will later testify that he was alluding to his concerns about risks inherent in the cementing procedure, but would say, “I didn’t have no doubts about it.” He’ll claim he had no argument but that “there’s a big difference between an argument and a disagreement.” Chief