A Sea in Flames - Carl Safina [13]
To reach for an analogy: if you did a negative test in a swimming pool, you’d empty the pool. If the pool stayed dry, you’d have a successful test. If you had a problem, the pool would start filling itself through leaks in its walls. A well 18,360 feet deep is a bit trickier to test than a swimming pool. Even though you’re reducing the pressure, you still have to keep enough downward pressure on the well to control any oil and gas that might start entering. And you must check specific pipes for indications of pressure.
Wells come in many different sizes and shapes and pipe setups. So, somewhat surprisingly, there isn’t a “standard” negative test.
Q: Do you know if there’s any standard negative test procedure that the industry follows?
Dr. John Smith: I was unable to find a standard.
The Minerals Management Service’s permit specified that this negative test be conducted by monitoring the kill line above the blowout preventer. John Guide: “And that was really the only discussion, was to make sure that we did it on the kill line so that we would be in compliance with the permit.”
Drilling fluid specialist Leo Lindner had spent four years on Deepwater Horizon.
Q: “And what is a good negative test?”
Lindner: “Where you don’t have any pressure up the kill. Of course … I haven’t been a witness to that many negative tests.”
And that’s another thing: negative tests are not routine on exploratory wells. The Deepwater Horizon mainly drilled exploratory wells. This well was unusual, because it was an exploratory well that was being converted to a future production well that would later be reopened and tapped. Not all the crew were familiar with all these steps and procedures.
Dr. John Smith: “Before they ever started the test, they’ve got enormously high pressure on the drill pipe.” That should have been, he noted, “a warning sign right off the bat.”
Leo Lindner: “They decided to go ahead and try to do the first negative test. They bled off some pressure from the drill pipe and got fluid back. They attempted it again and got fluid back.”
But as Dr. Smith had said: “If it’s a successful test, there’s no more fluid coming back.”
The crew had been replacing heavier fluid with seawater. But Lindner was sufficiently worried by the initial results that at around 5:00 P.M., he ordered his coworker to stop pumping drilling fluid off the rig. He wanted to keep his foot on the emergency brake.
At 5:30, Transocean’s subsea supervisor Chris Pleasant comes on duty in the drill shack. “My supervisor was explaining to me that they had just finished a negative test. Wyman Wheeler, which is the tool pusher, was convinced that something wasn’t right. Wyman worked to 6:00 P.M. By that time his relief come up, which is Jason Anderson, which is a tool pusher as well.”
It was a bad time to change guards.
But now it’s approximately ten minutes till 6:00. Bob Kaluza, the BP company man, tells Jason Anderson, “We’re at an all stop.”
Kaluza’s relief, BP company man Don Vidrine, is scheduled to come on at 6:00 P.M.
Chris Pleasant: “Jason Anderson, he’s convinced that it U-tubed. Where that U-tube’s at, I don’t know. But, you know, I guess we never really had a clear understanding. Anyway Jason is telling Bob that, ‘We want to do this negative test the way Ronnie Sepulvado does it.’ And Bob tells Jason, ‘No, we’re going to do it the way Don wants to do it.’ So, probably five minutes after 6:00 or something Don comes to the rig floor. Him and Bob talks back and forth for approximately a good hour.”
They discuss possible