A Sea in Flames - Carl Safina [148]
55 “The investigative team could find no evidence” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 40, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
56 “Go call the office” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Chris Pleasant, transcript p. 118, May 29, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670191/.
57 Cement bond log test’s importance and decision not to use it D. Hammer, “Costly, Time-Consuming Test of Cement Linings in Deepwater Horizon Rig Was Omitted, Spokesman Says,” NOLA.com, May 19, 2010; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/costly_time-consuming_test_of.html.
58 “Everyone on the rig was completely satisfied” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 43, lines 24–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
59 BP’s discussion of Halliburton’s cement BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
60 Halliburton and BP had prior knowledge that the cement failed tests J. M. Broder, “Panel Says Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill,” New York Times, October 28, 2010, p. A1. See also D. Cappiello, “Critical Test Not Done on Cement Before Blowout,” Associated Press, October 29, 2010. See also D. Hammer, “Oil Spill Commission Finds Halliburton’s Cement Was Unstable, Failed Several Tests Before Deepwater Horizon Disaster,” Times-Picayune, October 29, 2010. See also “BP, Halliburton Knew Oil Disaster Cement Was Unstable,” Agence France-Presse, October 29, 2010.
61 Even small cracks PumpCalcs, Orifice flow calculator: http://www.pumpcalcs.com/calculators/view/103/.
62 Events after 8:00 P.M. on April 20 BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 92, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
63 “eliminating all conventional well control” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Smith, transcript p. 409, July 23, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856507/. See also “Video: Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Footage, July 23rd, Part 49,” posted on July 25, 2010; http://www.dvidshub.net.
64 “Rig crew was not sufficiently prepared” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 108, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
65 Randy Ezell “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater