A World on Fire_ Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War - Amanda Foreman [114]
It was already midnight on December 10 when Thurlow Weed sat at his desk to compose one of the most serious letters he had ever written to his friend. “I have finally got Lord [sic] Newcastle’s own version of what was said to him,” he wrote; “whatever you did say—was said. This, with the allusions to Canada … is regarded as evidence of your determined enmity to England, and even the Friends you made here—many of whom I have met—are carried away by this idea. And consequently War, unless you avert it, is inevitable. I pray that I am not mistaken in the hope that you comprehend the disastrous effects of such a war.”50
The days passed and still there was no word from Washington. Nothing, however, worried Weed so much as his friend’s silence. He sent a letter to Lincoln, imploring him to “turn the other cheek”; Adams sent yet another letter to Seward.51 On December 14, Punch published a cartoon entitled “Waiting for an Answer,” which showed Britannia ready to fire a cannon. At the Foreign Office, Lord Russell continued to fret over whether they had made the right decision. Their dispatch to Lyons left no room to maneuver if Seward prevaricated or refused point-blank. But “I do not think,” wrote Russell, “the country would approve an immediate declaration of war.” A “peace meeting” at Exeter Hall in the Strand had attracted four thousand people. Russell asked Palmerston if they should give the United States a second chance, should the worst happen, so long as Seward’s letter was a “reasoning, and not a blunt answer.”52
Ill.12 Britannia ready to fire, Punch, 1861.
On Monday, December 16, London was plastered with black-bordered announcements of Prince Albert’s death. He had died at eleven o’clock on Saturday night. Moran knew about the prince’s alteration of the cabinet dispatch to Lord Lyons, and though he feared his action could be misinterpreted, he went defiantly to Buckingham Palace and signed his name in the condolence book. For good measure he added the names “Mr. and Mrs. Adams” next to his own. Late that same night, a messenger arrived with a dispatch from the State Department. The letter was short, too short considering the nature of the crisis, but it did contain Seward’s admission that Wilkes had acted “without any instructions” as well as the remark that the American government hoped that London would “consider the subject in a friendly temper.” Adams thought this “was not discouraging” but hardly a clear endorsement for peace. He wondered whether it was even worth showing to Lord Russell. Alarmed by this untimely display of diffidence, Moran and Wilson pleaded with Adams to go to the Foreign Office. Troopships were still departing for Canada and time was running out.
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The British lion had turned tail, or so Washington thought during the first week of December. Mercier’s execrable English created such confusion that Lincoln came away from their conversation believing that the British minister had given Mercier good news about England, and that Britain’s law officers saw nothing wrong in the commissioners’ seizure. “There would probably be no trouble about it,” Lincoln cheerfully asserted to his friend Senator Orville Browning after the meeting.53 Lincoln was also being misled by Charles Sumner, whose straightforward and sensible position on the Trent had become infected by his craving for popularity. At the beginning of the crisis, Sumner had assured the Duchess of Argyll that he would do everything in his power to resolve “any ill-feeling between our two countries.”54 But after he saw Lincoln on December 1 and realized that the president had no desire to release the prisoners, he abandoned his original position and suggested that they turn the case over to international arbitration. The plan protected the United States’ pride and salvaged Sumner’s; he