• Choose a category
• All
• Classic-Fiction

By Root 7076 0

into action. Nine-tenths of the House of Commons, he insisted to James Spence, “was in favor of immediate recognition” of the Confederacy. Spence thought he should wait for a Southern victory before forcing a vote, but Lindsay disagreed; his interviews with Emperor Napoleon in April had made it clear that the only impediment to Southern independence was the British cabinet. As proof, he could point to the leading article in Le Constitutionnel on June 1 that appeared to argue that France should offer to mediate in the conflict without bothering to wait for Britain.12.2 On June 17, Lindsay sent an arrogant letter to Russell warning him that the government would look weak and foolish if its foreign policy ended up in the hands of backbenchers like himself. “Within the next fortnight,” he boasted, support for the Confederacy would be unstoppable. James Mason fervently hoped that his friend was right. He was feeling rather downcast by their lack of progress. “We must wait for ‘King Cotton,’ ” he wrote to Slidell on June 19, “to turn the screw still further.”39

Two weeks later, Mason’s wish seemed close to being granted. The supply of cotton bales went down while the number of workers on poor relief jumped by another 11,000.40 There were more mass meetings in Lancashire. Even though the results of these meetings were often ambiguous, they were sufficiently heated to alarm the Union’s supporters.12.3 Lord Lyons had been back in Britain for only a few days, but he immediately grasped the seriousness of the situation. He reported to William Stuart, secretary of the legation in Washington, that cotton was “the real question of the day.” Obviously, Lyons was powerless to do anything from England, but, he told Stuart, “if you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton for England before the winter, you will have done a greater service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century.”42 The Duke of Argyll, John Bright, and Richard Cobden all wrote to Charles Sumner begging him to use his influence in facilitating the flow of cotton from the South.43

The U.S. legation was in a high state of anxiety. They had hoped to derail Lindsay by exposing the MP as an arms supplier or blockade runner for the South, but discreet inquiries into his business dealings revealed that the shipping magnate was scrupulously honest.44 Their best hope lay in a military success. “[We are] waiting the event of the struggle at Richmond,” Henry told his brother on July 4, 1862.45 London was swirling with rumors that Lee had defeated McClellan. “No one but me is sorry for it,” wrote Lord Lyons; until now he had not understood how sharply public opinion had turned against the United States.46 Despite the wild ups and downs of the past twelve months, he had never ceased to hope that the two countries might form some sort of an alliance, but “public opinion will not allow the Government to do more for the North than maintain a strict neutrality,” he wrote pessimistically on July 5, “and it may not be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from the US.”47 Adams tried dropping heavy hints to Seward that the North could not afford to alienate Europe while her armies looked so vulnerable. The “insurgent emissaries” here, he warned on the eleventh, were eager to seize on “every act” that might “cast odium on the [U.S.] Government.”48

After the latest news put McClellan in full retreat, Lindsay decided that the time for his motion had come. But over the next few days, the “nine-tenths” he had boasted of began to doubt the wisdom of forcing the British government’s hand. After initially encouraging him, the Tory leadership came to its senses and realized that the American war brought out too many conflicting passions to unify the opposition. “In fact, it seems that there is nothing good to be got out of this American question,” wrote a senior Tory on July 14.49 Lord Lyons was also quietly lobbying senior politicians against making any change to the current policy.50

Lindsay began to feel uncomfortable. Perhaps, he admitted, Spence was right after