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” who wrote that there was “a steady progress of opinion in one direction” regarding Palmerston and Russell. As to the latter, “I am informed upon the most credible authority, [Russell is] perfectly satisfied that there is not so much a shadow of a chance for the Yankees to overpower the united and resolute South, and that he would not be opposed to intervention if a reasonable hope could be entertained of its acceptance by the administration at Washington.”7

Whether or not Russell was “perfectly satisfied” before Second Bull Run, afterward he became a thorough convert to the idea that the war must be stopped. “I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates,” he wrote to Palmerston on September 17. “I agree further, that in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the South States as an independent state.” Russell ordered their ambassador in Paris, Lord Cowley, to have a quiet word with the French foreign minister, Édouard Thouvenel, about cooperation from the emperor.8

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For the Confederates, Lee’s victory at Second Bull Run was the signal to begin creating a groundswell of public sympathy in favor of Southern recognition. In France, Confederate commissioner John Slidell had heard through intermediaries that the emperor would not state publicly that the Powers should intervene until he had received unambiguous reassurances from Britain that it would follow suit. Henry Hotze put his stable of writers to work. “Since one journalist usually writes for several publications,” he explained to the Confederate secretary of state, Judah P. Benjamin, “I have thus the opportunity of multiplying myself, so to speak, to an almost unlimited extent.” He was not worried about “the sympathies of the intelligent classes [which] are now intensified into a feeling of sincere admiration.” But James Spence’s failure to stir up unrest in the manufacturing districts made Hotze fear that the working classes were implacable enemies of the South. “I am convinced,” he admitted, “that the astonishing fortitude and patience with which they endure [the cotton famine] is mainly due to a consciousness that by any other course they would promote our interests.”9

Hotze was overestimating his success with the “intelligent” classes and underestimating the unpopularity of the North among the workers. But what united all the classes in England, regardless of his efforts, was an ingrained hatred of slavery; the institution was an insurmountable stumbling block. Slidell and Mason could and did mislead potential Southern sympathizers when the occasion demanded. Camouflaging the South’s total dependence on slavery was the only way, for example, that Slidell was able to persuade the veteran abolition campaigner Lord Shaftesbury to give them his support. Slidell had targeted Shaftesbury because “his peculiar position as the leader of an extensive and influential class in England, and the son-in-law of Lady Palmerston gives a value and significance to his opinions beyond that of a simple member of the House of Lords,” he explained to Benjamin. But the relationship almost foundered in September when Shaftesbury asked him, in all innocence, “if the [Confederate] President could not in some way present the prospect of gradual emancipation. Such a declaration coming from him unsolicited would have the happiest effect in Europe.” Slidell circumvented the question by replying that abolition was an issue for the individual states to decide and he could not speak for all of them.10 Slidell was grateful that Lincoln was still publicly maintaining an ambivalent stance on slavery.11 On August 19, Lincoln declared in a letter published by the New York Tribune, “If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it.”13.1 It enabled him to suggest to Lord Shaftesbury that the chances of emancipation “were much better if we were left to ourselves than if we had remained in the