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view of the matter, that we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall have taken a more decided turn,” he told Russell on October 22. Rather than argue with Russell face-to-face, Palmerston stayed away from the cabinet meeting, which meant that nothing official could be decided. The members who did turn up argued heatedly with Russell and Gladstone, both of whom were so shaken by the experience that each afterward wrote detailed defenses of his position. Russell was especially upset with Lewis, whose memorandum had made him look foolish. The document accused him of propositions “which I never thought of making,” Russell wrote grumpily to Palmerston.24 He was beginning to feel cornered. A visit from Charles Francis Adams on the same day as the aborted cabinet meeting only served to increase his discomfort.

Adams had finally given in to his anxiety over all this talk of Confederate recognition and possible intervention and had sought an official interview with Lord Russell. He waited restlessly on the day of the twenty-third, watching the hours tick by until it was time for him to leave for his three o’clock appointment. He was disappointed when he arrived at the Foreign Office to find several ambassadors lolling about the antechamber still waiting for their meetings. Seeing his pained look, one of them tried to cheer him up but soon relinquished the attempt. Adams did not see Russell until half past four. By then he had rehearsed his position so many times that he was able to put his question to Russell as effortlessly as an afterthought. They were speaking about Lord Lyons, who had called on Adams that morning, and Adams casually “expressed the hope that he might be going out for a long stay. I had indeed, been made of late quite fearful that it would be otherwise. If I had entirely trusted to the construction given by the public to a late speech, I should have begun to think of packing my carpet bag.” Just as casually, Russell replied that Gladstone had been misunderstood and that the cabinet’s position remained unchanged. They talked on, but Adams was so relieved he no longer felt the need to press the issue, except to remark that the North would not take kindly to Gladstone’s speech.25 Russell did not detain him, equally relieved that he had been able to lie while sticking to the letter of the truth.

Lord Lyons left for New York on October 25. “I have sent off Lyons without instructions,” Russell informed Palmerston, “at which he is much pleased.”26 Lyons had never ceased waging his discreet but determined campaign, speaking quietly to both senior Tories and Liberals about the folly of interfering in the war. He felt a profound sense of loyalty and gratitude to Russell, but he refused to acquiesce in a policy that he believed to be morally and practically wrong. The cancellation of the latest cabinet meeting signaled to him that the proposal had died. “I am quite satisfied with the course the government means to take at present with regard to American politics—which diminishes the annoyance of going back,” Lyons told his sister on the twenty-fourth. During their four months together they had talked frequently about his coming home, and he promised, “My object now will be to bring my mission to America to an end as soon as I can with credit and propriety.” They probably both knew that this was a vain hope.27

Lyons was also mistaken about Russell’s proposal. It was napping rather than dead or dying. John Slidell’s informant wrote on October 28, “I have just returned from Broadlands … and have also seen several leading political men in town. My impression is that little or no progress has been made as regards your question.”28 During the last week of October the memorandum war continued as more cabinet members felt compelled to state their positions. When Russell received George Grey’s letter on the twenty-eighth, he thanked him “for writing me a letter instead of printing a Memorandum,” and compared it to Lewis, “who sprang a mine on me.” But why, he asked, did people think inaction was morally superior