A World on Fire_ Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War - Amanda Foreman [291]
Adams came to his senses after he received Russell’s indignant reply and hastily apologized for his letter. Henry Adams, on the other hand, was unrepentant. “They meant to play us, like a salmon,” he told Charles Francis Jr., until their father’s threat of war ended “the little game.… Undoubtedly to us this is a second Vicksburg. It is our diplomatic triumph, if we manage to carry it through.”17 It was Russell’s fault that the legation wrongly assumed Adams had scored a victory over him. His pride had brought him the worst of all outcomes: his efforts unacknowledged, his reputation tarnished, and the government made to look weak. Adams’s apparent diplomatic coup was naturally the talk of Washington. William Stuart was so alarmed that he spoke to Seward’s son, Frederick, on September 18 to explain the real sequence of events. But the myth of the British lion cowering under the onslaught of the American eagle had already taken hold.
Seward could not resist making capital out of England’s embarrassment. He had asked Thurlow Weed to plant newspaper stories about the dangerous rams in England, so that he could fight a “battle” and emerge the victor. Gideon Welles was infuriated by the ease with which his rival manipulated the news. “I am under restrictions which prevent me from making known facts which would dissipate this alarm,” he wrote in his diary. “It does not surprise me that the New York Times … and all the papers influenced by Seward should be alarmed. [He] knows those vessels are to be detained, yet will not come out and state the fact, but is not unwilling to have apprehension excited. It will glorify him if it is said they are detained through protest from our minister.”18
Charles Sumner unwittingly played into Seward’s hands. The rage and paranoia that had recently alarmed his friends burst into public view on September 10. Several thousand people crowded into the Cooper Union in New York to listen to him deliver a four-hour tirade against Britain. “I am disappointed and disgusted with Sumner’s own conduct,” wrote Lord Lyons after he had read the speech in full.19 Its real purpose, he believed, was to strengthen Sumner’s position against Seward. If the rams were stopped, people would remember the Cooper Union speech as being instrumental in the diplomatic victory; but if the warships were allowed to set sail, Sumner would be able to point to his speech as proof that he, at least, had been willing to confront the British. The vehement denunciations of Britain were baffling to Sumner’s friends. Some attributed his excess of feeling to his old head injury, others to grief over the recent death of his brother; all agreed on the calamitous damage to his reputation. Having positioned himself as the voice of moderation, his new bellicosity made him look like the worst kind of political opportunist. Lord Lyons would never trust him again; “I had hoped better things of him,” he wrote.20 One of the few letters of approval came from Seward, who, with exquisite irony, sent Sumner his hearty congratulations.21
The Economist announced there was no hope for Anglo-American relations if a “friend” like Sumner could make such a hostile speech. His accusation that the British government was conniving with the Confederates had to be answered, which Russell duly did in a widely praised speech. Sumner became agitated by the criticism coming from the other side of the Atlantic and obstinately stuck to his position, even after he learned that Russell had detained the rams before his Cooper Union speech. Protests from English acquaintances simply made his declarations more extreme. “If Russell wants cotton, let him withdraw all support … for the Rebellion,” he ranted