A World on Fire_ Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War - Amanda Foreman [66]
The French had yet to announce neutrality officially, although Seward was aware that France and Britain had agreed to work in tandem on American issues. It suited him to claim that England had acted alone and precipitately. He refused to receive Lyons and Mercier together or to acknowledge that there was an official understanding between the two countries. Mercier did not mind, since he was rushing ahead with schemes to end the blockade, which required extreme tact and patience on Lyons’s part to discourage.
“Every imaginable accusation of hostility to the United States is brought against Her Majesty’s Government,” Lyons reported to the Foreign Office. Seward’s propaganda campaign had succeeded in convincing the entire country that Britain had wronged the North. “Disappointment and exasperation are universal and deep,” wrote a New York lawyer in his diary. “The feeling of cordiality toward England—of brotherhood, almost of loyalty, which grew out of the Prince’s visit last fall (how long ago that seems!)—is utterly extinguished.”49 Lyons’s advice to London was to be firm but conciliatory, stay abreast with France, and “manifest a readiness on our part for war [though] the possibility of our being forced into hostilities is so painful a subject that I shrink from contemplating it.” Nevertheless, on June 10, Lyons telegraphed in cipher to Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, the commander of the North Atlantic squadron, to be ready for the following signal: “Could you forward a letter for me to Antigua?” Milne sent a notice to his officers: “Be on your guard and prepared. States may declare war suddenly.”50
Charles Francis Adams first heard of the British government’s anxiety about Seward on June 1, during a dinner party at Lord Palmerston’s house. Lady Palmerston had chosen the guest list with care, inviting people who were known friends of the North, such as Richard Monckton Milnes. Hoping this would have put Adams at his ease, after dinner Lord Palmerston spoke to him about Seward’s behavior. “He intimated,” recorded Adams, “that his ways of doing things towards Lord Lyons had been ungracious and unpleasant.” This was the first time Adams had heard of the tensions in Washington. It seemed unbelievable, and he almost told Palmerston that it had to be a misunderstanding. After reflecting on the conversation the following morning, Adams decided that Seward’s brusque manner was probably the cause, and he resolved to warn his friend to be more circumspect.51
On June 7, Ambrose Dudley Mann went to the Commons to observe William Gregory make his motion for recognition. Moran was also sitting in the Strangers Gallery and noticed with glee that the Southern envoy Mann “scowled awfully” as speakers from both sides of the House criticized Gregory for his unseemly haste. At length the scolding became unbearable, and Gregory withdrew his motion. Adams was writing his report of the debate when Dispatch No. 10 arrived at the legation. “I scarcely know how to understand Mr. Seward,” he wrote in disbelief. “The rest of the government may be demented for all that I know, but he surely is calm and wise.” Henry Adams was less forgiving. “A dispatch arrived yesterday from Seward,” he informed his brother on June 11, “so arrogant in tone and so extraordinary and unparalleled in its demands that it leaves no doubt in my mind that our Government wishes to face a war with all Europe.… I urged papa this morning, as the only man who could by any chance stop the thing, to make an energetic effort.”52
Adams was still angry and embarrassed that the