All the Devils Are Here [138]
In the fall of 2005, Countrywide’s board asked Kurland for guidance on how he envisioned dividing responsibilities with Mozilo once he became CEO. What ensued became a topic of much discussion and speculation in Countrywide’s top ranks. As other former executives recount the story, Kurland was furious. He didn’t want any division: either he was going to be CEO or he wasn’t. He didn’t want the title if he wasn’t going to truly be in charge, especially given that Mozilo could be a loose cannon and that Sambol, in his view, needed reining in. Kurland sent Mozilo an e-mail that became infamous in Countrywide’s upper ranks, outlining his expectations for the role Mozilo would have when he stepped down. Essentially, Kurland outlined a structure in which he would be running the company and Mozilo would assume the classic role of the ex-founder: “non-executive chairman of the board,” an honorific with no power. Kurland, says one person, was even reluctant to have Mozilo continue as the company’s spokesperson on CNBC.
The memo led to a bitter—and childish—feud between the two men, one that consumed inordinate amounts of everyone’s energy. Mozilo was deeply offended and, as the story goes, when Kurland tried to apologize, Mozilo refused to accept it. “There’s no way I deserve this after a thirty-year relationship,” Kurland told one person.
Increasingly, Kurland felt like he was fighting a losing battle on two fronts, according to someone he confided in. “A period of torture” is how this person says he described Kurland’s time at Countrywide after the feud began. As the Fed continued to increase interest rates—it did so seventeen times in a row between June 2004 and June 2006—Kurland became increasingly worried about the housing market. But within the company, he and others who felt that way were the Chicken Littles. Kurland, according to another person, also agreed with Countrywide’s supervisors at the Federal Reserve, which oversaw the holding company (while the OCC regulated Countrywide’s bank), about the importance of both the proposed industry-wide guidance on nontraditional mortgages as well as uniform standards for appraisal practices. Both Mozilo and Sambol pushed back. Kurland told a confidant that he didn’t think he could win a battle for control with Mozilo, because the board was in the founder’s pocket. He felt that he could have gotten the executive ranks to line up behind him. But doing so would have required cutting a deal with Dave Sambol and giving him more control than Kurland wanted him to have. “Maybe I’m not cutthroat enough,” Kurland said at one point.
Finally, Kurland reached his limit, according to executives who watched the feud play out. The entire company had become obsessed with what some called “the battle at the top.” It was distracting. The company needed to be focusing its energies on the housing market, not its internal soap opera. Kurland told Mozilo that if their standoff didn’t end, it would destroy the company. Although no one on the outside knew it, by the spring of 2006 Kurland was essentially out of Countrywide’s management.
By the summer, people who paid attention to Countrywide were starting to realize that something was up. “I was in Denver with Angelo,