American Rifle - Alexander Rose [267]
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24. V. Hicken, The American Fighting Man (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 106.
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25. Cowan, Sergeant York and His People, pp. 154–55.
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26. D. Crockett, Life of Col. David Crockett, Written by Himself . . . (Philadelphia: G. G. Evans, 1860), pp. 237–38 (for a detailed description of shooting for beef), p. 194.
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27. As a result, Bradley wrote, “I had the staff set up a short-range firing course in the woods with partially concealed cans for targets. The men had to traverse this wooded course, spot the cans and shoot quickly. It was a radical departure from the standard static long-distance firing range.” Another time, when Churchill and Eisenhower visited, they held an impromptu shooting match using the new M1 carbines. Churchill’s target was set up 25 yards away, Ike’s 50, and Bradley’s 75. Sadly for posterity, ‘all the targets were tactfully removed before anyone could inspect them.’” O.N. Bradley and C. Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p.107. On the shooting match, see photo no. 30 in the insert.
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28. Cowan, Sergeant York and His People, pp. 23, 152.
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29. Quoted in G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War—Myths and Realities (London: Review, 2002), pp. 253–54.
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30. On Pershing’s tactics, see ibid., pp. 252–56. By mid-April 1918 Pershing was looking for-ward to “the possibility of open warfare being substituted for trench warfare.” See cable of April 12, in United States Army in the World War, p. 2:320.
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31. So arresting were the bloody news reports from the front that even Crossman, Scientific American’s accuracy fanatic, had to accept that “superiority of fire” could no longer refer exclusively to superiority of marksmanship but instead referred to the practice of sending sufficient bullets toward the enemy to make him keep his head down so that bayonet-armed troops could advance rapidly. Pershing, My Experiences, pp. 1:11–12; T. L. McNaugher, The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 27n35.
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32. “General Principles Governing the Training of Units of the American Expeditionary Forces,” in United States Army in the World War, p. 2:296.
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33. The preceding section is based on J.S. Hatcher’s article, “Our War Secret: The Pedersen Device; the Springfield Was to Be a Miniature Machine Gun in 1919,” in the May–June 1932 issue of Army Ordnance, which is reprinted almost in full in W. S. Brophy, The Springfield 1903 Rifles: The Illustrated, Documented Story . . . (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1985), pp. 156–64; and also Hatcher’s similar article, “The Pedersen Device,” American Rifleman 80, no. 5 (May 1932), pp. 7–9, 36. There were two types of Pedersen device, which I have conflated here for the sake of simplicity: the Mark I, which was designed for use with Springfield rifles, and the Mark II, for use with Enfields. The army ordered 133,450 Mark I devices and 500,000 Mark IIs. On the number of demobilized soldiers in the U.S. Army, see R. F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 396; and on the postwar boards, Hatcher, Book of Garand, p.34. Details of Pedersen’s life are difficult to discover, but his Wikipedia entry, based primarily on material in L. L. Ruth, War Baby!: The U.S. Caliber .30 Carbine (Cobourg, Ont.: Collector Grade, 1992), is useful.
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34. Hatcher, Book of Garand, p. 42.
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35. “Information for inventors desiring to submit semiautomatic shoulder rifles for test to the Ordnance Department,” February 11, 1921, in Hatcher, Book of Garand, p. 46.
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36. J. S. Hatcher, “The Military Semiautomatic rifle,” American Rifleman 80, no. 3 (1932), pp. 11–17; Hatcher, Book