American Rifle - Alexander Rose [279]
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47. Hallahan, Misfire, p. 472.
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48. On Besson, see his obituary in Washington Post, July 18, 1985, p. C6.
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49. Regarding the order, see McNaugher, M16 Controversies, p. 85.
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50. W. J. Howe and E. H. Harrison, “The ArmaLite AR-15 Rifle,” American Rifleman, May 1962, pp. 17–23. For the 40 percent figure, see Ezell, Lightweight Rifle, p. 335, and J. Fallows, “M-16: A Bureaucratic Horror Story,” Atlantic, June 1981, p. 61. According to McNaugher, M16 Controversies, p. 109n44, “because Col. Harrison was a retired ordnance officer, most of the AR15’s advocates saw this article as little more than Army propaganda.” Interestingly, LeMay was not unaverse to changing the barrel twist to one in 12.This was because, in cold weather, increased air density amplified the bullet’s tumbling and many of LeMay’s SAC bases were in northern Europe and the far north. (Ezell makes this point on p. 335.)
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51. On Hitch’s background, see Grant, “Operations Research and Systems Analysis,” in Jessup and Ketz, eds., Encyclopedia of the American Military, pp. 3:1966–70.
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52. McNaugher, M16 Controversies, pp. 85–86; Stevens and Ezell, Black Rifle, p. 109.
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53. See McNaugher, M16 Controversies, p. 109n38.
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54. Ibid., p. 87.
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55. Grant, Colt Legacy, p. 185.
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56. J. Raymond, “M-14 Rifle Output Now Satisfies U.S.; Delays Overcome,” New York Times, October 16, 1961, p. 1; McNaugher, M16 Controversies, p. 88.
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57. McNaugher, M16 Controversies, pp. 91–96. On MacDonald’s furious reaction, Stevens and Ezell, Black Rifle, p. 115. Based mostly on a minute of a meeting held at AMC headquarters on October 22, 1962, which noted that “the U.S. Army Infantry Board will conduct only those tests that will reflect adversely on the AR-15,” Hallahan, Misfire, argues (pp. 482–84) that the tests were deliberately skewed by the army to favor the M14. McNaugher, however, claims the bias was inadvertent. The AMC remark, incidentally, was firmly denied, and, moreover, it seems an odd thing to record if one is intent on conspiracy. According to Ezell, Lightweight Rifle, p. 323, regarding the statement, “there was no further evidence to support this seeming bias.” For the one-billion-dollar estimate, see W. Beecher, “Billion Dollar Bang: The Pentagon Prepares to Choose Her Rifle from Among Four Models,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1964, p. 1.
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58. The SPIW was announced in “New Developments: New Infantry Method,” Ordnance, May–June 1963, p. 714, cited in McNaugher, M16 Controversies, p. 97. For the change in date, see McNaugher, p. 117.
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59. Ibid., p.117; H.W. Baldwin, “Army Tests Dart-Throwing, Hand-held Weapon,” New York Times, March 15, 1964, p. 25.
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60. Ezell, Lightweight Rifle, p. 326. An extremely early army training film of the XM16E1 (the trial version of the weapon) can be viewed at www.archive.org/details/Rifle556mmXM1 6E1OperationandCycleof FunctioningTF93663.
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61. W. Beecher, “Choice of Basic Rifle Stirs Pentagon Debate in an Age of Missiles,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1963, p. 1.
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62. The story was printed on November 6, 1963, p. 7. See also an editorial, “A Shot in the Dark,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1963, p. 18.
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63. “ ‘McNamara’s War’ Tag OKd by Defense Chief,” Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1964, p. 15.
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64. “All U.S. Bases Studied for Possible Cuts,” Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1964, p. 9.
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65. Quoted in McNaugher, M16 Controversies, p. 116.
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66. On these figures, see American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Center