American Rifle - Alexander Rose [282]
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3. See Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Acquisition of the Objective Individual Combat Weapon, Report D-2006-004, October 7, 2005, p. 2; also Appendix F, “Project Manager Soldier Weapons Memorandum for XM8 Carbine,” pp. 48–49.
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4. M.Cox, “Too Late, XM8: Doomed Carbine the Victim of Army Infighting,” Army Times, June 1, 2007.
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5. J. Jackson, “Pentagon Backs Spiral Development,” Washington Technology, June 9, 2003.
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6. See W. M. Arkin, “Spiraling Ahead,” Armed Forces Journal, February 2006.
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7. Quoted in ibid.
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8. “M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date,” appendix A of “USA’s M4 Carbine Controversy”; P. Leicht, “M4A1 Rifle Delivers Flexibility,” Leatherneck, October 2004, pp. 34–35.
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9. In a classified report entitled “M4A1 5.56mm Carbine and Related Systems Deficiencies and Solutions: Operational and Technical Study with Analysis of the Alternatives.” Portions are cited in M. Cox, “Better than M4, But You Can’t Have One,” Army Times, posted online March 1, 2007. (There are earlier postings of this article dating from late February.) A letter submitted by Colt’s chief operating officer in response to the piece, dated March 26, notes that the army disagreed with the SOCOM findings, adding that the company’s subsequent improvements “eliminate[d] those few problems.” The letter can be found at www.colt.com/mil/news.asp or at the Army Times Web site.
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10. See C. R. Wonson, “Replacing the M16A2: A New Rifle for the 21st Century,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 2001, pp. 20–23.
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11. “M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date,” appendix A of “USA’s M4 Carbine Controversy.”
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12. M. Remez, “Colt on the March,” Hartford Courant, December 5, 2004, pp. D1–2.
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13. On the case, see R. Lardner, “Reliability, Cost of U.S. Forces’ Standard Rifle under Scrutiny,” Washington Post, April 27, 2008, p. A11.
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14. J. M. Moran and R. Kalra, “Winchester Aims to Close a Factory, End an Era,” Hartford Courant, January 18, 2006, pp. A1, A5; D. Haar, “Farewell Bids at Winchester,” Hartford Courant, September 28, 2006, pp. A1, A7.
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15. Worse was to come. Three years later Smith & Wesson’s chairman, James Minder, resigned after it was revealed that in the 1950s and 1960s he had participated in an armed-robbery spree and had spent fifteen years in jail. Convicted felons, even ones running gun companies, are banned from owning or possessing firearms. Fate, however, would be kinder to S&W than to Winchester. Soon afterward Michael Golden, the new president, reoriented the company toward military and police sales, hired new marketing and sales executives, beefed up its lobbying, and aggressively pursued exports, thereby greatly driving up revenue and profits. L. Wayne, “Armed and Competitive: Military Sales Help Smith & Wesson Fight Its Way Back,” New York Times, April 11, 2006, pp. B1, B4; R.Thurman, “Smith & Wesson Launches Aggressive Strategy,” Shooting Industry, August 2005.
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16. Project Manager Soldier Weapons, Soldier Weapons Assessment Team Report 6-03, July 31, 2003, pp. 1–64. Similar views on the M4 were expressed in a report by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Smith, Operation Iraqi Freedom: PEO Soldier Lessons Learned, May 15, 2003; available online at www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/index.htm.
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17. Quoted in H. Kennedy, “Army Tests New Rifle That Could Replace M16, M4,” National Defense, February 2004, p. 42.
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18. “M4 Carbine Contracts Announced to Date,” appendix A of “USA’s M4 Carbine Controversy.” For the contract sum, see I. Kemp, “Assault Rifles in a 5.56mm Evolution,” Armada International, 2, April–May 2007, pp. 36–38, 40.
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19. For a typical example of