American Rifle - Alexander Rose [76]
President Lincoln, like Washington and Jefferson, took a keen interest in firearms development. Here he tests a rifle on his firing range on the White House lawn, only to be challenged by a passing patrol alarmed at hearing gunshots in the capital.
Ripley had come close to crossing the line, but at this moment, with the Union on the ropes and Lincoln facing mounting criticism for his conduct of the war, the chief of ordnance was unfirable. He remained the only man in Washington who was capable of producing the titanic numbers of weapons that the government needed. Besides which, there was no one of sufficient seniority or experience available to replace him. Lincoln bided his time, possibly comforting himself with the illusion that Ripley’s insubordination had resulted from a miscommunication.
Over the following two years it would become evident that there had been no such thing. Ripley’s intransigence on the subject of breech-loaders and repeaters grew steadily more obnoxious. When Lincoln requested Sharps rifles for Colonel Hiram Berdan’s famous Sharpshooters outfit, Ripley did not order them and instead issued them Springfield rifles. In the spring of 1862, after much backstairs maneuvering to circumvent Ripley, Berdan eventually acquired Colt revolving rifles that he was able to exchange for the much-desired Sharps. In November 1861, when General McClellan—who, despite his other faults, was keenly interested in repeaters—directed Ripley to provide one thousand Colt revolving rifles for one unit, the latter never deigned to exert himself.127
A look at the hard figures of what Ordnance bought for the army between April 12, 1861, and December 31 of that year demonstrates the success of Ripley’s adamant refusal to introduce any kind of breech-loader into the service. The bureau purchased 236,157 rifles and rifle-muskets in that time, of which just 2,676 were breech-loaders—a shade over one percent.128
Eventually Lincoln tired of Ripley’s machinations and obstreperousness, authorizing Edwin Stanton, his new secretary of war in 1862, to make “some changes” at Ordnance for “the success of military operations and the safety of the country.”129 Ripley’s successor, secretly selected by Lincoln and Stanton, was to be Major Alexander Dyer of the Springfield Armory, but he declined the promotion, claiming that his work at Springfield was too crucial for the war effort for him to leave now.130 At a loss as to what to do next, Lincoln and Stanton approached General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a good old loyalist, to advise them.
Hitchcock, to their surprise, thought it unadvisable to remove Ripley, at least not yet. Like it or not, within Ordnance circles Ripley, despite his short-temperedness, was regarded as the Boss, a deadly Washington player who protected the department from outside interference and got things done. “If this belief be shaken” by his dismissal, said Hitchcock, “the operation of the whole system is endangered,” and thus the Union war effort might well falter. Stanton was a little skeptical about this assertion, but nevertheless he “concluded not to make any change just at that time and not until I had become further acquainted with the business of the office.”131
That didn’t stop him from putting Ripley back in his place. Stanton first cut off most direct communication with him by appointing Peter Watson as assistant secretary of war. Henceforth Ripley would be answerable to Watson (an unofficial demotion, as Ripley well knew) while still subject to Stanton’s whims. The secretary took to occasionally, and with sadistic high-handedness, summoning him to his office. One time in March 1862, when Ripley was ordered