Ameritopia_ The Unmaking of America - Mark R. Levin [61]
Madison argued that the structure would work. In Federalist 45 he wrote, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will for the most part be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”19 In Federalist 39 Madison insisted that “the proposed government … extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.…” “[States and localities are] no more subject within their respective spheres to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.”20 In Federalist 14, Madison observed, “It is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments which can extend their care to all those other objects, which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity.”21
Moreover, in Federalist 9, Madison accused the Anti-Federalists of misconstruing Montesquieu. “The opponents of the PLAN proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they subscribe with such ready acquiescence. When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions, far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia, can by any means be compared with the models, from which he reasoned and to which the terms of this description apply.” Madison argues that if Montesquieu is read no further, “we shall be driven to the alternative, either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt.… So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.”22
Madison then quoted directly from Montesquieu: