Area 51_ An Uncensored History of America's Top Secret Military Base - Annie Jacobsen [228]
8. outing the Oxcart was a terrific idea: If the public knew about Oxcart, there would no longer be a reason to have the Agency in charge of a program that needed secrecy as a cover. The Air Force knew the CIA had done all the work getting Oxcart up and running; now was the time to push the Agency aside. This echoes what happened with Curtis LeMay’s early summation of the U-2 program in 1955: “We’ll let [the CIA] develop it and then we’ll take it from them,” from Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 24.
9. they could take over Oxcart: Letter, General Bernard Schriever to Eugene M. Zuckert, July 11, 1963, Top Secret.
10. McCone tried a different approach: CIA Memo, Meeting with the President, Re: Surfacing the OXCART, 29 November, 1963, 1. “The development of the CIA and Air Force reconnaissance planes (15 in number) would cost about $700 million, of which about $400 million have now been spent.” This figure does not include the aircraft’s “extraordinary engines,” made by Pratt and Whitney. Regarding those costs, Lockheed Skunk Works chief (from 1975–1991) Ben Rich wrote, “The CIA unhappily swallowed the enormous development costs of $600 million.”
11. the fictitious name A-11: Parangosky, The Oxcart Story, 4: “The President’s reference to the ‘A-11’ was of course deliberate. ‘A-11’ had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft first proposed by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a second man for launching air-to-air missiles. To preserve the distinction between the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all participating personnel in government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy continued in effect. There was considerable speculation about an Agency role in the A-11 development, but it was never acknowledged by the government.”
12. “The world record for aircraft speed”: Public Papers of Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1964, 1:322–23.
13. the aircraft were still dripping wet: Interview with Colonel Slater.
14. “without the specific knowledge of the President”: Summary of Meeting with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Gilpatric, General Carter and Mr. McCone on 5 July 1962. DCI Records dated 6 July 1962.
15. approved the Oxcart for Operation Skylark: Carter Memorandum to Wheelon, “SKYLARK,” 22 Aug. 1964.
16. according to Ken Collins: Interview with Ken Collins.
17. specially designed J-58 turbojet engines: Interview with Dr. Robert Abernethy. Robarge, Archangel, 12–13.
18. two men working there were crushed to death: Rich, Skunk Works, 221.
19. tiny black dots began to appear: Ibid., 223, from a story told by Norm Nelson, the CIA-Lockheed Skunk Works liaison during Oxcart.
20. nearly knocking him unconscious: Interview with Ken Collins.
21. he always sat patiently with the project pilots: Ibid.
22. “Fix it,” Park said: Rich, Skunk Works, 221. This story was also clarified for me by Ken Collins, who provided additional details.
23. “‘Get me out of here!’” Rich later recalled: Rich, Skunk Works, 227.
24. Project Kempster-Lacroix: Interview with Ed Lovick; Pedlow and Welzenbach, Central Intelligence Agency, 42.
25. the government had exploded 286 nuclear bombs: Through Operation Hardtack there were 119 aboveground tests. Testing resumed on September 15, 1961. From then through the end of 1964, there were 167 underground tests at NTS, including 4 at Nellis Air Force Range.
26. “The first jamming system was called Red Dog”: Interview with Kenneth Swanson.
27. Trapp thought it sounded interesting: Interview with Charlie Trapp.
28. General Ledford, the head of the Office of Special Activities: My portrait of General Ledford is based on my interviews with men who knew him well, including