Augustus_ The Life of Rome's First Emperor - Anthony Everitt [102]
Although a tribune friendly to Octavian entered a timely veto, Sosius’ intervention flushed Octavian out. In mid-February he gathered around him supporters and Caesarian veterans, and returned at their head to Rome. This was, in effect, his Rubicon, for he was staging something very like a coup d’état. On his own initiative, he convened a meeting of the Senate. He had absolutely no right to do this, but the consuls and the senators turned up at the session. He must have wondered whether he was riding events or they were riding him. Dio reports that he surrounded “himself with a bodyguard of soldiers and friends who carried concealed daggers. Sitting between the Consuls in his chair of state, he spoke at length and in moderate terms in his own defence, and brought many accusations against Sosius and Antony.”
For the consuls, this triumph of force could not be allowed to stand. “As they did not dare to reply to [Octavian] and could not bear to be silent,” in Dio’s sharp words, they secretly left Rome and set sail for the east. They were accompanied by between three and four hundred of Rome’s one thousand senators—republicans or supporters of Antony.
On the limited evidence available it is hard to be sure whether or not this move was a defeat for Octavian. Unlike the former triumvir, the consuls could claim legitimate political authority and, although the senators who joined them were a minority of the total membership, they were a substantial number of the ruling elite. What is more, it was uncertain how many of those who stayed behind were fully signed-up supporters of Octavian. Seasoned observers of the political scene will have seen a comparison with the flight from Rome in 49 of Pompey the Great and most of the Senate when Julius Caesar invaded Italy and launched the first of the civil wars. Ahenobarbus and Sosius could argue that they were taking “Rome” with them.
It looks as if Octavian was taken aback when he learned what had happened. He needed to neutralize the rebuff; pretending it was what he had always had in mind, he claimed that he had sent the senators away voluntarily. Anyone else who wanted to leave had his full permission to do so.
The upheavals at Rome were concentrating minds wonderfully. It was now certain that there was to be another round of civil war. Throughout the Roman world, men of importance in the state were considering their position: with whom were they to side?
XIV
SHOWDOWN
32–31 B.C.
* * *
In early 32 B.C., it became obvious to everyone that Antony and Cleopatra had made an important and highly controversial decision. She was to accompany Antony on the campaign, in which she meant to play a full part. In no small measure as a result of Octavian’s propaganda, the queen had become very unpopular among Romans, who disapproved of a foreign potentate interfering in their affairs. Her emergence as the co-general, in effect, of a Roman army further alienated opinion.
When Ahenobarbus and the others arrived from Rome, they were irritated by what they found. The consul cordially disliked Cleopatra, refusing to address her as queen and calling her simply by her name. He strongly advised Antony to send her back to Egypt to await the outcome of the war. Herod the Great of Judea, a bitter enemy after years of merciless bullying by the queen, gave Antony some confidential and cruel advice: Cleopatra’s continuing presence would damage his chances; the path to success was to put her to death and annex Egypt. At one point Antony did order her back home, but then relented, taking the line of least resistance, and let her stay. There were even reports that he was growing frightened of her.
In April 31 B.C., the multitudinous military machine set off on its slow journey to Greece.
Octavian’s strategy was to sit and wait. It was obvious that Antony was heading for