Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [15]
The curiously swept-back “shark tail” was part of Boeing’s plan was to make the 7E7 as instantly recognizable and distinctive as the humped upper-deck 747. It was therefore the first-ever Boeing jetliner outlined initially by industrial designers with aesthetics in mind. Led by Boeing’s Director of Differentiation Strategy Blake Emery, the group took inspiration from Clotaire Rapaille, a French industrial designer who helped influence the shape of Chrysler’s PT Cruiser. His cosmetic suggestions included a fish-like fuselage shape, prounounced bird-like wings, and an all-new flamboyant blue and white “house” paint scheme. The final shape would only slowly emerge after aerodynamic refinement and thorough engineering design trades. In terms of looks, Boeing admitted that the Sonic Cruiser was a hard act to follow. Mark Wagner
Following initial work in the University of Washington’s low-speed wind tunnel, the Sonic Cruiser model was tested in Boeing’s transonic facility. These proved that the shape had good stability and drag characteristics right up to Mach 1.08. “When we looked at the first data we said ‘wow,’” said Walt Gillette, who added that there was no indication of “Mach tuck”—a potentially treacherous nose-down pitch change that can occur as the supersonic shock, and the center of pressure, move aft. Strain gauges also detected no onset of buffet, another danger that in some aircraft had led to in-flight breakups.
At the 2001 Paris Air Show that June, however, the Sonic Cruiser ran into its first serious trouble. The problems started when remarks by Boeing Vice Chairman Harry Stonecipher, apparently dismissing the seriousness of the possible environmental impact of the Sonic Cruiser, were published in a British newspaper. The comments attracted the attention of European Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom who, in an open letter, retorted angrily to Stonecipher’s alleged cavalier attitude.
Referring to Stonecipher’s remarks about there “being plenty of fuel still around” and “the environmental bandwagon,” she said, “I find it hard to believe that anyone today could afford himself the luxury of a ‘let’s not think about tomorrow’ attitude, which runs diametrically opposed to the aims of sustainable development.” Questioning the entire speed concept, Wallstrom asked “whether a one-hour time saving on a transatlantic flight is worth a significant increase in carbon dioxide emissions contributing to climate change. In my view, this environmental price is simply not worth paying.”
Completing her salvo, she said that “aircraft emissions already contribute to about 3.5 percent of man-made greenhouse gas emissions and are expected to double over the next ten to fifteen years. Instead of building even faster planes, your industry should work toward improved environmental performance, dramatically improving the efficiency of aircraft and developing aircraft powered by alternatives to fossil fuel.”
Airbus made the most of the Paris Air Show to publicly denigrate the project, and the nickname “Chronic Snoozer” was frequently overheard around the European company’s chalet. Airbus Chief Executive Noel Forgeard declared himself surprised at the interest being shown “in an aircraft that has a twenty percent increase in fuel consumption for a marginal increase in speed.”
Undeterred, Boeing continued its detailed audit with the airlines. But there were worrying signs, particularly among the U.S. majors, where the softening economy was taking its toll on yields. Business travelers were flying less, and the success of new low-cost carriers such as JetBlue, as well as the original budget airline, Southwest, was pushing the creaking legacy carriers to the brink. Many operators were in survival mode, unaware that something much worse was about to hit them: the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001.
The Sonic Cruiser fell foul of the volatile relationship between Europe and the United States over the environment and U.S. refusal to ratify the Kyoto