Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [19]
To get around Sonic Cruiser infrastructure concerns, Boeing presented airlines with alternative configurations. One was a “midwing” design that combined fairly conventional wings and tail surfaces with a “wasp-waisted” or area-ruled fuselage. The concept was configured with two main cabin cross sections, a wide cabin section in the fore body and aft body, and a slimmer midbody section. The design resurrected a far-reaching 1972 Boeing-NASA study that evaluated area-ruling in several concepts optimized for cruise speeds in the Mach 0.9 to 0.98 range. Lia Ravelo
Gillette himself sensed the swing, and at that year’s Farnborough Air Show publicly acknowledged for the first time that change could be coming. “Never lose sight of the fact that this is a free enterprise and we build aircraft the market wants. In the end, the market could choose a conventional aircraft with Sonic Cruiser technology, but that’s not what we’re emphasizing. The conventional aircraft is quite a bit more fuel-efficient, but fuel is not the big cost number right now,” he said.
It was not only the prospect of rising fuel costs that troubled the airlines. After the initial enthusiasm, some carriers wondered how the Sonic Cruiser would fit into their complex network operations. The aircraft’s higher cruise speed meant earlier arrivals and departures, particularly on transpacific routes. Although Boeing had set up a “network analysis group” to help the carriers evaluate the benefits of Cruiser operations, and put a figure to the cost savings on crew expenses, the logistical challenges of slotting in the aircraft’s unusual timings into hub and spoke connections were proving difficult.
By early September 2002, the scene was set for the final showdown over the future course of Boeing’s product development. With airline interest in the Sonic Cruiser clearly on the wane, Boeing knew that its fourth and last prelaunch set of meetings with potential operators was to be the crucial decider.
The Sonic Cruiser gave way to the more compelling 7E7 at a time when efficiency was the key for the airlines. Battered by the global slowdown and the market fallout as a result of the devastation of 9/11, they needed to save money, not time. Efficiency was already starting to improve thanks to the development of large twins such as this 777-200ER, seen here on its final approach to London Heathrow in 2003. Mark Wagner
Held at the Bell Harbor Conference Center at Seattle’s Pier 66 in late October, Boeing hoped the meeting would help decide once and for all whether speed was valued over efficiency. The airlines were virtually unanimous, and none gave a high rating to a Mach 0.98 cruise capability, while all gave maximum points to a 20 percent cut in fuel burn relative to a 767. The bottom line was that speed and Sonic Cruiser were out, Yellowstone and efficiency were in. But for Roundhill there were few regrets. “It seems like a long process, but boy, when you make a decision on an aircraft, it stays with you for fifty years. You’ve just got to get it right,” he said.
E FOR EVERYTHING
The Sonic Cruiser was difficult to let go for Boeing, but the industry had spoken. First details of the reference aircraft, now renamed “Super Efficient,” were revealed semipublicly the following month at a Society of Automotive and Aerospace Engineers conference in Phoenix, Arizona. After once again reviewing the Sonic Cruiser options, which by now encompassed the baseline aft-wing as well as two midwing finalists, Gillette showed the expectant group what they had been waiting for: a first view of the mysterious “reference airplane.”
To the uninitiated the Super Efficient was a rather conventional-looking “tube and wing” aircraft with none of the exciting outward innovations of the Sonic Cruiser. Yet Gillette’s PowerPoint slide revealed a hybrid 767-777–like design incorporating virtually every new technology of the Sonic Cruiser, with the obvious exception of the transonic design’s unique shaping.