Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [24]
If these targets could be achieved, Boeing planned to seek board authority to formally offer the aircraft by year’s end, and to seek customer commitments during 2004. Assuming launch later in 2004, firm configuration—the major design milestone when the aircraft was ready to be released to engineering and the companies making the parts—was expected in the second quarter of 2005. This would set the clock ticking on a production buildup that would culminate with the first flight in 2007 and initial deliveries in 2008.
But how gimmicky were the sloped cockpit windows and the other features, particularly the shark tail? Were they for real, or simply marketing? Boeing said the latest configuration changes had to be “aerodynamically positive or neutral,” but conceded they were aimed at “differentiation.” Mike Bair said, “We want to go beyond baseline to something that people will know by sight—like the way we all know a 747 when we see one.”
Aside from the marketing hype, Boeing was under no illusions about the true impact the 7E7 was already starting to have on the company, let alone the market. “It’s another transformational aircraft,” said Boeing Commercial chief executive Alan Mulally. “It’s a chance to define the future. It will mark another significant improvement in efficiency. How can we miss?”
The target was big enough according to Boeing’s analysis, which now suggested a market of two thousand to three thousand aircraft for the 7E7. “We are providing the all-time fragmenter, a point-to-point enabler,” said Mulally. “The thing that changed the world with the 767 was its economics and its range, because it could overfly hubs. The 7E7 will be like this. It will be the equivalent of a regional jet for international use.”
Yet how could Boeing be so optimistic about a new middle-market aircraft when it was in the process of shutting down the 757 line for lack of orders, and with no certainty over prospective military developments, was on the verge of committing the 767 to “death row”? To Mulally the answer was simple. The 7E7 was going to be far more than a 757/767 replacement in terms of performance, capacity, and economics. “The point is, when you look at the world, some eighty-eight percent of all the dollar value will be in this area. If you serve that with the 7E7, that’s your market,” Mulally said.
Mulally also believed that the new twin formed a “rallying call for everything we’re going to do for a better value solution. We will take partnerships to a new level. We’ll do less of the detailed work, and we’ll have shorter assembly times. The 7E7 will be the next significant improvement in production efficiency.”
But uncertainty still dogged the company, which had been rocked by scandals and big losses on the defense side of the business, culminating with the resignation of Condit and the recall of Stonecipher from retirement. Boeing workers in the Seattle area were nervous, particularly as the 7E7 production site selection was imminent, and corporate confidence appeared to be at an all-time low. A cartoon of Stonecipher and Condit did the e-mail rounds, showing the pair as the silent movie–era slapstick comedy duo Laurel and Hardy. Beneath them was a caption depicting their trademark, saying, “Here’s another fine mess.”
But Stonecipher acted quickly to dispel rumors that he was prepared to veto the 7E7 unless a rock-solid business case was proven. Rushing to Seattle early in December to be briefed by Alan Mulally and 7E7 project leader Mike Bair, Stonecipher said, “Everything we have seen about it says the airplane has the potential to be a game-changer.”
Despite the unsettling developments, Boeing’s 7E7 development team had been busy finalizing the complex work share arrangements with the newly emerging structures team. Details were announced to the world on November 20, 2003, just a week after meetings were held in Seattle to brief eighty airlines and eight