Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [6]
Production nightmares overtook Boeing in 1997 when the Next Generation 737 ran into “a perfect storm” created by late changes to the horizontal stabilizer, certification issues with the overwing escape exits, and a simultaneous production ramp-up. Boeing soon ran out of room to perform the rework, as this image of Renton’s crowded ramp can attest. Mark Wagner
While Boeing was on strike, Airbus was nearing launch of its A3XX super jumbo, and appeared to be well in the ascendancy with a clear family plan based on just three main products, including the A320 and A330/340 versions. The PD group was given a new priority—find out how to simplify Boeing’s future product strategy along similar lines.
The answer, it seemed, involved the concept of “platforms.” Instead of a plan to succeed its broad range of 717, 737, 747, 757, 767, and 777 products on a one-for-one basis, Boeing began to envisage a simpler “platform” approach, covering the one-hundred- to six-hundred-passenger range. At first the plan included four main platforms, or P-1 through -4, all of which would share as much common hardware and systems as possible to fit the ACPS processes, cost, and schedule goals. To show how the plan would work, platform planners used the analogy of Black & Decker hardware to illustrate its concept, citing the use of the same common core components in everything from drills to saws.
The base technology components for the platforms were 777 structures, systems, avionics, and propulsion. The P-1 study was focused on the lower-capacity end of the market, at about 100 to 200 seats, covering the capacity range catered to by the 717, 737, and 757. P-2 was focused on the middle of the market, in the 180- to 300-seat size, and encompassed ranges from one thousand to six thousand nautical miles. The P-3 study was primarily in the 300- to 400-seat and above range, covering the 777 and lower 747 capacity sizes. P-4 was the top end of the 747 market and above. The platform idea also suited Boeing’s all-embracing Project 20XX, which aimed to project a clearer view of the company’s future product development strategy for the twenty-first century.
“The task changed from LAPD to working on platforms,” recalled Jackson. But the platform idea had its drawbacks. “One of the dilemmas of this approach was it assumed we weren’t going to develop much new technology,” he said. “We were looking at configurations that looked like 777s, except some were smaller and some were larger. But the problem was marketing wanted more and more features—LD3 capability, wider seats, greater comfort, and particularly range.” It was worse in the midmarket, where Boeing’s 767 was losing ground to the increasingly popular A330-200. “With 777 technology there was no chance you’d ever get an aircraft better in cash operating costs than the 767 you’re trying to replace. There was no hope for something like that,” he said.
Something needed a shake-up, and Jackson, a quietly spoken engineer, felt the need for more urgency. “I felt it was time to get a little more bold in my nice-guy attitude. I got John Roundhill’s blessing to get more aggressive because I wanted to get something for people to get excited about.” Roundhill recalled that “Duane Jackson, the chief engineer of new airplanes, said it was time we took a hard look at an aircraft that would be capable of making a big leap in operating economics and fuel burn. He was talking about 10 percent better operating economics and 20 percent lower fuel burn.”
The spark for Jackson’s enthusiasm