Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [61]
CHANGING PICTURE
With hindsight it is curious to see how the evolution of the engine requirements somehow became a distant warning signal for the whole Sonic Cruiser/Yellowstone effort. Almost overnight in late 2001 the landscape changed for the engine makers, who suddenly faced more difficult and expensive decisions. The simple derivative approach was gone, and the course was set for make-or-break verdicts that would decide the destiny of the big fan engine for a generation to come—but not in the way anybody could have anticipated. Having already begun to revise their designs for the Sonic Cruiser engines, the big three manufacturers were arguably better prepared to deal with the shift to the 7E7. Thrust requirements were cut by around 20 percent, and the operating cycle was far more conventional. However, while power and cycle were more familiar, the efficiency targets were definitely not. Battle lines were drawn up through late 2002 and early 2003 as the engine makers worked feverishly on design concepts that embraced technology that was sufficiently advanced to meet Boeing’s tough outline requirements yet mature enough to be considered low-risk.
The first major milestone event came in February 2003, when Boeing called all three to Seattle to be issued the initial set of 7E7 propulsion system requirements. Based around specific targets for takeoff, climb, and cruise thrust performance—as well as fuel consumption, emissions, noise, and installed weight—the “Phase 1” briefing also included details of the tough schedule, which called for entry into service in mid-2008, less than 5 1/2 years later. Key targets included a 60,000-to-75,000-pound-thrust family, with options for derated lower-thrust variants, 17 percent better fuel consumption per seat, and 10 percent lower operating costs than the 767-300ER. They also called for reduced installed weight that would contribute to a lower gross weight than the A330-200. Overall, much was required of the engine makers, which were expected to contribute about 80 percent of the 7E7’s overall performance improvements.
Boeing planned at this stage to make its final engine selection by the end of 2003, though this would later slide into 2004 as the company revised its plans for the 7E7SR (short-range). The stakes were huge for winners and losers alike. Boeing wasn’t saying so, but given the obvious cost benefits of the exclusive 737/CFM and 777LR/GE relationships, all believed its preferred solution tended toward a sole-source partnership. GE naturally backed this to the hilt, while both Rolls and P&W more realistically supported dual-source scenarios.
Of the three, P&W had the most to lose. This suspicion was telegraphed by the urgent tone of the company’s commercial engine president, Bob Leduc, who said in February 2003, “We do believe Boeing is going to do the program and we are going to be there. It’s that simple and come hell or high water we’re going to win!” In the early 2000s, Pratt’s position in the big-fan commercial world was slowly but surely becoming marginalized, with slowing sales of the PW4000 in traditional A330 and 777 markets, and greater emphasis on partnership programs such as the Engine Alliance GP7200 with GE on the A380, and International Aero Engines V2500 on the A320 family. The company, once the world’s leading commercial jet engine maker with the incredibly successful JT3D, JT8D, and JT9D series, was looking for ways back in. To regain its single-aisle greatness, it harbored ambitions for the future with its geared turbofan technology development. But for a guaranteed presence in the mid- and far-term