Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [90]
Boeing had predicted inevitable problems with the formidable logistics of the global assembly plan, and to help overcome these, appointed outside specialists to effectively manage the process. The company, called New Breed, was used on other Boeing programs and interfaced between the suppliers and the final assembly line, providing receiving, sequencing, kitting, inventory, and order management. They helped provide prekitted parts for line-side delivery where they were required for final assembly.
Although New Breed’s system was designed to accommodate slips in the schedule and some out-of-sequence work, it was stretched to the breaking point under the strain of the supply-chain train wreck. “The challenge for New Breed at the moment is there are a lot of ‘traveled parts’—which is not a part of their plan,” said Scott Strode who, at the time, remained outwardly optimistic of a quick recovery. “We have a lot of work going on to mutually understand that,” he added.
Growing worries over weight increases led to the redesign of several parts on the 787-8 well before first flight. Among these were the main landing gear doors built at Boeing’s Winnipeg, Canada, site, plus sections of the surrounding structure. In common with almost every commercial airliner development, the 787 encountered inevitable weight growth during development. Early A380s entered service in 2008 about 11,000 pounds over the weight specified eight years earlier, and Boeing too earmarked a series of design changes to cut weight as problems grew. From firm configuration in 2005 to production in 2008, maximum empty weight grew by about 12,500 pounds, requiring initiatives ranging from new floor beams to lighter seats. Mark Wagner
Dark composite contrasts clearly with the anticorrosion-treated painted aluminum inboard rib of this Mitsubishi-built wingbox, or Section 15. Design issues included development of special tapered sleeve bolt fasteners to eliminate potential ignition sources in the fuel tanks, wiring changes, and weight-reduction features. Empty weight design improvements were designed for incorporation from the twentieth wing set onward, along with an overall takeoff weight increase, to maintain range and payload goals. Mark Wagner
There was another problem: when they did arrive, the parts did not fit together as perfectly as planned. On June 12, just before the start of the 2007 Paris Air Show, the Seattle Times published a worrying revelation. When Everett workers mated the Section 41 nose unit with the Section 43 center fuselage, a 0.3-inch gap appeared between the butt lines. In a trade where mismatches of a few thousandths of an inch are considered canyonlike, the news was astonishing.
At the air show in France, Bair provided an explanation that, in retrospect, was almost as concerning as it was meant to be reassuring. The sections, it appeared, had been delivered so incomplete that they did not include adequate secondary support structure. As a result the barrels had slightly deformed, or “sagged,” said Bair. “The issue was because we didn’t have all the fasteners to put in the secondary structure. Spirit had to put the structure into the cradle while they finished it, and it turned out that it sagged a bit and got a minor bulge in the lower part of the barrel.”
Overlooked amid the mismatches were precision fits between the wings and the fuselage that would have made headlines on any previous program. Scott Carson told Bair that the fit had been “absolutely astonishing”—with the left wing only one forty-thousandths of an inch out of alignment, while the right wing was “dead on.” The result, said Bair, was a “testament to the accuracy of the design tools, and the stability of composite technology, which will serve us well as we increase production.”
Titanium supplies became a “watch item” in the early days of the program, just as large billets of the material were needed for large, long-lead forgings such as the main undercarriage leg, an example of which is seen here.