Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [92]
By late September it became increasingly obvious that the struggle was too much, and in the first week of October, Boeing quietly warned Chinese carriers, with a cumulative sixty orders, that delays were likely. At a painful program review the next Monday, October 8, the 787 management team formally acknowledged that they were facing a six-month delay. Since this was large enough to impact the company’s performance, Boeing had no choice under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations but to arrange a press conference to publicly disclose the problems.
An early setback was the decision to drop, at least for the moment, plans to install a wireless in-flight entertainment system. Here a ship set of seat-back screens, all hard-wired together, undergo tests at Boeing’s integrated aircraft systems lab. Mark Wagner
Pictured during rollout at Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas, the first nose Section 41 was shipped as an empty shell to Everett. Spirit, like other first-tier partners, had been fighting a losing battle to complete its subassembly on time because of inadequate support from its many tier two and three suppliers. Many of these smaller companies lacked sufficient numbers of quality inspection and production personnel to support Boeing’s ambitious ramp-up. Note the peach-colored streaks marking the zones between the caul plates used during processing in the autoclave. Succeeding Section 41s became increasingly complete, with ZA004 100 percent complete. Guy Norris
By late 2007 the first sections for ZY998, the fatigue airframe—also known as line number 9998—were collecting together at Everett. Here the tail fin, festooned with mounts for strain gauges, awaits integration. Mark Wagner
MORE DELAYS
On October 10 McNerney and Carson confirmed that deliveries of the initial thirty to thirty-five aircraft to the first fifteen customers would be delayed. At the same time, both stressed that the basic program remained sound. “We wish we didn’t have to do this,” McNerney said. “But new kinds of innovation, as this airplane represents, represent challenges.” Carson added that unplanned rework on ZA001 had “simply proved to be more difficult to complete” than expected. “Acceleration on the work we needed to see has not occurred, but we do believe the more difficult structural work is now behind us.”
More resequencing of work was also under way to ease the strain, particularly at the Charleston and Vought factories, where the use of new workers and facilities had come under increased scrutiny. With hindsight, Carson said training needed to be tackled earlier at sites such as Global Aeronautica, though he added, “there is no fundamental flaw in Charleston.” McNerney insisted that the company’s basic global manufacturing strategy remained valid. “We’re convinced that as we work our way through these problems we’re going to be glad when we get to the other side of start-up.” Despite the delays, Boeing still predicted delivery of 109 aircraft by the end of 2009, just three short of the original plan. The good news, said Carson, was that software was “no longer a pacing item. We expect to have flight test–ready software fully loaded in the next few weeks. The final load for the simulator was delivered in September and is working very well.”
Six days after announcing the new delays, Carson had more news. On October 16 he named Pat Shanahan vice president and general manager of the 787 program, replacing Bair, who returned to his former role as vice president, business strategy and marketing, for Commercial Airplanes. Shanahan, who had overseen the last days of the 757 as well as headed the 767-400ER, moved from vice president, missile defense systems, at Boeing Integrated Defense Systems. Here he had helped turn around the troubled ground-based midcourse defense system, a complex antimissile program. Referring to this experience, Carson said Shanahan would “tackle the challenges we face