Boeing 787 Dreamliner - Mark Wagner [95]
On March 20 Boeing confirmed the worst, but played down the impact. “It is a normal part of the development of a new airplane to discover need for improvements, and that is what we are experiencing on the 787. The robust test process in place on the 787 program has confirmed the majority of our designs, but we have found the need for some improvements.” The problem turned out to be a potential weakness revealed when panels in the Fuji-made twelve-by-five-foot composite spar section buckled prematurely during structural testing. It emerged that to save weight, Fuji had reduced the gauge of the composite spars running transversely across the unit, but the tests showed that it had been cut back too much.
A temporary fix, involving stiffeners attached in situ, was developed for the first six aircraft. “All airplanes after airplane seven will have the solution incorporated from the beginning,” Boeing said. To reassure the wobbly investment community, already concerned over the 787 delays, Boeing added that “the fundamental technologies being used on the 787 are proving to be reliable and effective” and that “material choices and manufacturing techniques for the airplane are sound.”
ANOTHER SLIPPAGE
By now it was obvious that further schedule changes were coming. Sure enough, on April 9, the company revealed not only more delays, but also a major reshuffle of the overall development schedule for the 787-3 and 787-9 variants. The first flight was set back to an unspecified time in the fourth quarter of 2008, due to “slower than expected completion of work that traveled from supplier facilities into Boeing’s final assembly line, unanticipated rework, and the addition of margin into the testing schedule.”
The new delivery schedule was based on a more conservative production plan developed with the 787 suppliers. That revised schedule now targeted the first delivery in the third quarter of 2009, with “approximately 25 deliveries” by the end of that year, 69 in 2010, 103 in 2011, and 120 in 2012. The stretched 787-9 was now brought forward and was to be the next derivative, with delivery planned for early 2012. The shorter-range 787-3, previously set for delivery in 2010, now became the second derivative.
Rework and traveled work were the chief culprits, but Carson believed that the latest plan was far more realistic. “Our revised schedule is built upon an achievable, high-confidence plan for getting us to our power-on and first-flight milestones.” The decision to opt for a more gradual production ramp-up resulted from a comprehensive assessment of its supply chain and production system announced in January. The result eased pressure on the supply chain but came at a steep price for the airlines, and inevitably for Boeing, which now faced hefty compensation payments. “We deeply regret the disruption and disappointment these changes will cause for our customers, and we will work closely with each of them to minimize the impact,” said Carson.
News of the rescheduling was met with relief by most of the suppliers, some of which spoke openly for the first time about the problems. Hamilton Sundstrand President David Hess, speaking to Aviation Week, blamed the repeated delays on an overambitious schedule and a logistics collapse associated with Boeing’s rush to keep its July 2007 rollout on schedule. Once suppliers fell behind, Boeing “panicked a little bit, and rather than follow the logistics plan that they had planned on where everything gets delivered to the structure partners . . . they said, ‘Everybody just send your stuff here.’ So bang, tens of thousands of parts ended up on the factory floor without any documentation or traceability. They had to start putting a jigsaw puzzle together without any directions.”
Further home truths emerged later in April, when McNerney sent a message to Boeing employees. Though reaffirming his belief in the global-partnership model, McNerney said, “We may