Broker, Trader, Lawyer, Spy - Eamon Javers [109]
In one case, Shaw’s company went to work for a large research and development company that suspected a member of its senior management was providing details of products to a competitor. Esoteric describes the results in its brochure:
Through the use of a covert tracking device and other surveillance resources, it was established that the director was collating highly confidential product and client information in order to assist him in any future employment, with a long-term view of setting up his own business in direct competition with his current and past employers and selling their products as his own. Although difficult to quantify the potential loss of revenue to the company, had the director successfully stolen products and client information the financial stability of the company would almost certainly have been affected.1
In another case Shaw discusses, her company went to work for a real estate development firm at which several employees had recently quit at the same time. The bosses suspected that the departing employees had stolen client lists and client information. What’s more, the company suspected that the former employees were setting up a new business based on those stolen details.
Shaw began surveillance on the former employees with teams following four subjects for six to eight weeks. The surveillance operatives tailed the ex-employees to a printing shop, where one of the employees photocopied site plans. Esoteric’s operative, wearing a baseball cap in which a covert imaging device was embedded, approached the photocopier, getting close enough to take clear pictures—with the camera in his cap—of the site plans that the unwary ex-employee was busy photocopying.
Over the next few weeks, the spies discovered that the ex-employees were visiting potential real estate development sites, that they had leased space, and that they had hired people to work for their fledgling firm. On one day, one of Shaw’s surveillance teams followed an ex-employee to the bank, and using the same camera cap, photographed the bank account manager. The operative moved in to get pictures of the documents on this manager’s desk, images which when enlarged revealed bank account numbers, financial figures, and transaction details. “We can get in quite close,” says Shaw, even in a security-conscious environment like a bank, but “not in all circumstances, not in all banks.”
The team leader phoned the client while the subject was still in the bank, reporting, “This is what’s going on right now. Is this of interest to you?” In hard-fought legal battles, there can be injunctions or prohibitions in place against certain activities. The surveillance team’s client may swing into action in real time to stop the suspicious transaction. In this case, all the details gathered were invaluable information for the client’s lawyers when the ex-employees’ former firm filed suit against their new company for breach of contract.
In every case, a surveillance operation produces a detailed log, in which the operatives note the dates, times, and addresses where surveillance took place. At the end of each day, the team members gather for a debriefing session. They go over the logs to check for any inconsistency, or add details that couldn’t be noted down on the fly. Each operative signs the log with a coded number, and stands ready to serve as a witness in a client’s court case, verifying in court that the activity noted in the report took place. “The client may have a summary report, but if they want it, they have access to and they can have a copy of the surveillance log itself,” says Shaw.
In the cases she describes, Shaw portrays her operatives as coming to the aid of a company that’s been wronged in some way. But she concedes that her firm also works for clients seeking, within the bounds of the law, to do harm to a competitor’s business, typically by ferreting out important information. In such cases, the surveillance isn’t defensive, to preserve the client’s standing