Bushwhacked_ Life in George W. Bush's America Large Print - Molly Ivins [112]
All this was before September 11. In both Europe and Canada the media pay far more attention to world affairs than do the American media. As a result, Bush’s reputation as a unilateralist and even an obstructionist was set in cement before the attacks. As the British Guardian put it, Bush’s foreign-policy vision “has largely amounted to trashing existing agreements without any clear idea of what to put in their place.”
Then September 11 changed everything. For a while.
Following September 11 the administration appeared to reverse much of its earlier policy. Unilateralism was suddenly replaced by multilateralism, as Colin Powell put together the coalition to topple the Taliban and other partnerships to chase al-Qaeda around the world. The whole world was with us. WE ARE ALL AMERICANS NOW was the headline in France’s Le Monde on September 12. French citizens covered the American Embassy in Paris with flowers, often accompanied by touching notes with references to World Wars I and II. At the changing of the guard at Buckingham Palace, the band played “The Star-Spangled Banner.” People all over the world collected money to send to the families of the victims in New York and Washington. For the first time, NATO invoked Article V of its charter, committing all members to side with the United States under attack. New possibilities for breaking down old enmities surfaced, as Iran, China, and others with whom we had less-than-cordial relations expressed outrage and sympathy. Nation building was suddenly off the shit list and back in vogue.
France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, Norway, Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania all sent troops to Afghanistan and helped pay for the war there.
On September 20, George W. Bush made the speech of his life, his post-attack address to Congress. The allies were quiet about Bush’s “you’re either with us or for the terrorists” doctrine (countries, like people, prefer to make up their own minds, without threat of coercion), but secretary of state Colin Powell worked adroitly to keep the coalition together. As of November 1, 2001, we reversed our earlier stand on the biological-weapons treaty and came up with a tough new enforcement plan for the once-abandoned pact. The Clinton administration’s plan to go after offshore banks was reintroduced as part of the PATRIOT Act. House Republicans, led by Dick Armey and Tom DeLay, tried to remove it, but Tom Daschle announced that the Senate would not vote for the bill without the anti–money-laundering provision. Time magazine did a devastating story on the lobbyists who came out of the woodwork to protect the offshore-banking system, and with that House Republicans began asking their leadership, “Why are we fighting this?” Hard to defend tax dodgers in a time of national crisis. It was included in the bill.
Bush ignored the doubters, waded into Afghanistan, and won. The military victory was no surprise,* but was nonetheless gratifying. Bush had redefined himself as a war president, and a successful one at that.
Five months after September 11 and the defeat of the Taliban, we were back to the antebellum status quo.
In his 2002 State of the Union address, Bush praised President Musharraf of Pakistan, perhaps our most problematic ally, but failed to thank the other coalition partners. By his account, America had struggled alone against the evildoers, against the forces of darkness. Not to use what Bush once called the language of “diplomatic nuanced circles,” the allies were royally pissed-off by this. Big-time. (In the Afghan war, seventeen non-American allied troops died.) Powell had announced a Middle East peace plan in November, but that was gone by February and the rhetorical offensive against “rogue states