Cadillac Desert_ The American West and Its Disappearing Water - Marc Reisner [286]
Strictly regulated, the Ogallala could have been made to last hundreds of years instead of decades. Irrigation farming could have been slowly phased in, kept at a lower level, and gradually phased out. In such a case, hundreds of thousands of people who became dependent on it overnight wouldn’t face ruin, and the states’ economies wouldn’t go into sudden osmotic shock when the pumps began bringing up air. The states had begged the government to build them dams for irrigation, and they had lobbied to keep the price of water artificially low, arguing that agriculture was the only stability they had. the opportunity for economic stability offered by the world’s largest aquifer, however, was squandered for immediate gain. The only inference one can draw is that the states felt confident that when they ran out of water, the rest of the country would be willing to rescue them.
As deputy chief of planning for the Bureau of Reclamation in the mid-1960s, Jim Casey saw things from a fundamentally different perspective than the farmers, or, for that matter, most of his eleven thousand colleagues. The main concern of the typical Bureau engineer is building a bigger and grander project than the last one. It was Casey’s job to think about what few of them did, or dared to: reservoirs silting up, river-basin funds drying up, salts building up—all the problems consigned through some unwritten conspiracy between politicians and bureaucrats to an amorphous, distant, and politically unrewarding future. Casey was, by definition, the Bureau’s Cassandra. Peering into the future, he saw no place headed for deeper trouble than the Ogallala region. If surface water can be compared with interest income, and non-renewable groundwater with capital, then much of the West was living mainly on interest income. California was milking interest and capital in about equal proportion. The plains states, however, were devouring capital as a gang of spendthrift heirs might squander a great capitalist’s fortune. To Casey’s amazement, few of the farmers seemed to realize it. “They thought the water would last until the Second Coming,” he says. Frustrated by the farmers’ blindness, he finally decided that he had better address the one group that might listen to him: the region’s bankers.
“I think it was about 1966 when I went out to give my speech,” Casey says. His voice, after twenty years in Washington, is still thickly gravied with West Texas drawl. “You wouldn’t believe how many bankers there are in Lubbock. I said to them, ‘Look, you’re all riding high out here and it’s a great thing and we all like to pretend that great things are going to last. But no aquifer can sustain this rate of pumping. I don’t know when you’re going to run out of water, but I’d bet you’re going to run out at about the same time you start running out of oil and gas. If that gets too expenseive the farmers won’t be able to pump,