Car Guys vs. Bean Counters - Bob Lutz [21]
Other things had a hand in destroying the once-great Cadillac brand—for instance, the misguided “4-6-8” engine that was to run on, depending on the situation, four, six, or all eight cylinders.This was to be a Cadillac exclusive, saving fuel when possible and delivering V8 power when required. Sadly, the electronics of the 1980s weren’t up to the task. The engine, hastily introduced for Godknows-what marketing reason, never worked properly, became a constant source of inconvenience for owners, and achieved the dreaded status of late-night network comedy fodder.
Engines in general seemed to bring out the worst in Cadillac. One general manager insisted on Cadillac getting the V8 diesel destined for Oldsmobile. Diesels were in vogue; Mercedes had them on some models, and they were more fuel-efficient. Unfortunately, GM’s diesel was converted from a gasoline engine, and countless car companies around the world had spent decades learning that the lightweight, low-pressure construction of a gasoline engine formed a rickety foundation for the much-higher compression loads of the diesel engine. Undeterred by the failures of others, GM converted a large gasoline V8 into a diesel engine, with exactly the results expected by the rest of the industry: GM’s diesels failed expensively, often at very low mileages and requiring replacement with an equally flawed V8 diesel sibling. The resulting reputation disaster not only dealt another body blow to the “Standard of the World” (by now a laughably inappropriate designation for Cadillac) but actually soured the American public on the real fuel-economy benefits of diesel engines for two decades.
Should I mention the Cadillac Cimarron? It was, perhaps, the ultimate shaming of this once-proud brand. GM, eager to participate in the growing market for smaller luxury cars like the BMW 2002 and the later 3-Series, wanted a “small Cadillac.” (This was in the late 1970s, when the American public, or at least the more educated portion thereof, ceased to blindly associate “bigger” with “better.”) The idea was right, but the execution wasn’t. Rather than design and engineer a vehicle of high style and appropriate import-matching chassis and engine technology, the company went “fast and dirty” on the assumption that the public wouldn’t notice.A Chevrolet Cavalier was hastily “Cadillized” with a Cadillac grille and badges and an interior which, while plusher than its Chevrolet donor, was still at least three grades too shabby to be taken seriously in a small luxury car. The Cimarron, too, flopped miserably and became the butt of late-night jokes, further degrading the tattered remnants of Cadillac’s reputation.
Part of the problem with the Cimarron, as well as other Cadillacs of the era, was the front-wheel-drive layout used in all GM passenger cars except the Chevrolet Corvette, Pontiac Firebird, and Chevrolet Camaro. The key small-luxury-car competition, Germany’s BMW and Mercedes brands, were rear-wheel drive, and that layout, for better or worse, was held to be superior in that category by the car magazines and the more knowledgeable buyers.
The man who locked GM into “all front-wheel drive” is the same one who launched the ill-fated Saturn brand and the push to automate virtually everything: Roger B. Smith, GM chairman and CEO from 1981 to 1990. We’ll touch on those two well-intentioned catastrophes later, but first a little anecdote: While chairman of Ford of Europe, I ran into Smith in a hotel lobby during a major European auto show. After chatting amicably, he asked me if it was true that Ford of Europe’s new midsize car, the Sierra, was going to be rear-wheel drive. I told him it was, and that we were very comfortable with the decision. It saved us hundreds of millions of dollars, and a positive reception was ensured because rear-wheel drive was already the layout of choice for the German prestige brands.
At this, Roger Smith’s already florid face turned a radiant crimson. In a voice that can only be described as squeaky, he angrily pointed out my colossal