Car Guys vs. Bean Counters - Bob Lutz [44]
The Cadillac STS was another disaster in the making. With a steep windshield and a very flat roof, it exuded all the charm of a brick. I asked why the roof was so wide and flat, and the VLE explained that it was so we could reuse the sunroof from the prior model. (Remember: VLEs had “parts reuse” targets in those pesky PMPs!) I commented that it seemed silly to ruin the appearance of the vehicle just to save a sunroof and suggested that if reuse were the goal, they should take the one from the smaller CTS instead.
All saw the obvious “brilliance” of this proposal (which was also less expensive), and the roof shape, windshield angle, and tumble-home (the angle at which the car narrows toward the top, important for proportion and the look of stability) were now all available for correction, albeit with about a one-year delay. The VLE, mindful of his timing goals, was not amused and had the finance people churn out reams of data quantifying all the revenue lost by the delay. When this disagreement reached Rick Wagoner, he, to his everlasting credit, said,“I’m tired of seeing financial analyses telling us it’s better to do a lousy car earlier rather than a good one later. We are going to delay this program, and get it right!” It was one of many times that Rick’s support, at a critical juncture, facilitated the changing of the product-creation culture.
To illustrate my point on the state of design and research at GM on my arrival, here are summaries from some of the clinics and subsequent actions in the period just before I rejoined.These notes were supplied by a person close to these product programs at the time. Read and believe, if you can. It’s all true!
1. Research for the original Cadillac SRX indicated that consumers disliked the angular, wagonlike exterior styling. A key designer, however, believed strongly that the car tested poorly due solely to its high level of design reach. He argued that they would like it in two years when it hit the market, and that current consumers could not predict this future state. The marketing division made a strong plea to stop and redesign the vehicle. In the end, the decision was made to move forward in spite of the weak research results, in the belief that future consumers would be more accepting of its angular lines. Unfortunately, as predicted, consumers did not warm up to the design once it reached production, and it did not sell well.
2. The original Buick LaCrosse was tested in what was thought to be its final design form in September 2000. Despite poor ratings from consumers, however, virtually nothing changed in the design until [Lutz] came to GM in 2001. The car was also disliked by many people internally, and even the designers directly involved were upset at the results from rigidly applying brand character cues to an old architecture that lacked styling enablers, to the point of causing extreme stress and health problems for one of the designers. Similar to other programs at the time, it was on its way to being produced, even though it had tested so poorly, due to timing pressures and a general disdain for consumer input. I believe that [Lutz’ team] redesigned the car as much as possible; however, the team was still somewhat tied up by timing, architectural constraints (old W car), and capital. More research was conducted on the redesign in June of 2002, and there was significant improvement . . . enough to make it