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The case selection in these burden-sharing studies allowed for a test of the key assertion that cases in the same type should have similar outcomes. Germany and Japan fit the same type, as they were both dependent on the United States for security, relatively distant from the Middle East, dependent on foreign oil, and domestically constrained on the use of force. The typological framework passed this test of its viability, as these similar cases had very similar outcomes—both states provided over $8 billion each but sent no combat troops. Other states, such as Syria and Iran, had similar values on many of their independent variables but very different outcomes, pointing to Syria as a deviant case that allowed a test of which independent variables accounted for the differences in outcomes (in this instance, differing domestic politics, relations with the United States, and offensive bandwagoning motivations). This illustrates how case study researchers, after constructing a property space, should be alert to “targets of opportunity,” identifying potential case studies that might fit various research designs, including most similar cases, least similar cases, deviant cases, crucial cases, and so on. It is also often possible to carry out more than one of these kinds of case study or case comparison within a single study—cases that are most similar with respect to one another, for example, may be least similar to a third case, or a case may be most-likely for one hypothesis and least-likely for another.

Table 11.1 also draws attention to the empty types. Most of the empty types in this instance seem socially possible, and readers may be able to think of examples from the Gulf War or other security crises. Indeed, some of the cases studied were of types that seemed least plausible according to the theory. For example, it seems unlikely that a country whose contribution would be useful or even necessary for defeating Iraq, whose security was threatened by Iraq, and whose security depended on the United States would face significant domestic opposition to contributing to the coalition—yet this domestic opposition was strong in Turkey, so unusual domestic political circumstances may have been omitted from the theory. (Indeed, in 2003, a newly elected Turkish government, facing intense public opposition to assisting the imminent U.S. invasion of Iraq, chose not to allow the United States to use Turkish territory to launch the invasion.) Thus, even though the outcome in this case fit that predicted by the theory, the process was rather surprising. Similarly, we might expect few instances in which a country had no international incentives to contribute but domestic audiences favored a contribution, yet there were many such countries (most of which made symbolic contributions). These cases point to altruistic “share the spoils” motives left out of the theory.

Subsequent opportunities for alliance burden-sharing, while not yet studied in full, appear upon initial examination to fit this typological theory fairly well and offer opportunities to further refine it. These more recent cases include NATO’s participation in air strikes against Serbia over the issue of the status of Kosovo, the U.S.-led coalition in the war against the Taliban government of Afghanistan, and the U.S.-led coalition in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.506 The war against the Taliban, in particular, provides a good example of a potential building-block addition of a new type to the theory. In the study of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the authors set aside the case of Israel as too idiosyncratic to include in the general theoretical framework. In effect, Israel contributed to the 1991 anti-Iraq coalition by not contributing—it heeded U.S. requests not to take military action against Iraq, even while under attack from Iraqi Scud missiles, because action by Israel would have made it difficult politically for Arab states to continue to contribute to the coalition. Although this provided a clear historical explanation for