Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [141]
One example will suffice to indicate what a policymaker must do to move from an abstract conceptual model to a specific strategy tailored to a particular situation. Coercive diplomacy relies on threats to induce an adversary to stop or undo a hostile action in which he or she is already engaged. To convert the abstract concept of coercive diplomacy into a specific strategy, the policymaker has to make a specific determination for each of the following four variable components of the general model:
1. What demand to make on the opponent
2. Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand
3. How to create and convey a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be sufficiently credible and sufficiently potent to persuade the adversary that compliance is in his or her best interest;
4. Whether to couple the threat with a positive inducement (i.e., a “carrot”) to make compliance easier for the adversary and, if so, what kind and how much of an inducement to offer and how best to make the positive incentive sufficiently credible and sufficiently potent
These variable components of the abstract model of coercive diplomacy may be likened to blank lines that the policymaker must fill in when designing a specific strategy of coercive diplomacy.
The strongest strategy of coercive diplomacy is the ultimatum—either explicit or tacit—in which the demand on the opponent is accompanied by a deadline (or a sense of urgency about compliance) and is backed by a sufficiently potent and sufficiently credible threat of punishment for noncompliance.524 A weaker variant of coercive diplomacy is the “gradual turning of the screw,” in which the sense of urgency about compliance is diluted, though not altogether absent, and the punishment threatened is not a single potent action but an incremental progression of severe pressure. Even weaker is the “try-and-see” variant of coercive diplomacy, in which the demand is not accompanied by a sense of urgency for compliance and may be backed only by a modest coercive threat or action, which, if ineffective, may or may not be followed by another modest action or threat.
Therefore, a general concept is not itself a strategy; rather, it needs to be converted into a particular strategy. There is only one concept of deterrence and one concept of coercive diplomacy, but there are quite a few different deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategies.
This distinction between concepts and strategies, and the relation between them, is of considerable contemporary significance. Consider the debate as to whether U.S. policy toward China should be one of containment or engagement. In simplistic versions of this debate, these terms serve as little more than rhetorical slogans. Theory and policy both require recognition that there are different strategies of containment and different variants of engagement.525
CONDITIONS THAT FAVOR SUCCESS
In addition to conceptual models that lead to formulation of strategies, practitioners need generic knowledge about the conditions that favor the success of specific strategies they may employ. Much of this knowledge takes the form, as emphasized in this book, of conditional generalizations—statements that indicate the conditions under which a strategy is likely to be effective or ineffective.
Generic knowledge is a useful label for a form of theory that is of recognizable interest to policy specialists. This can be illustrated by recalling the experience one of the authors had some years ago in interviewing policy specialists. Their eyes would glaze