Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [162]
Martin recognizes that the strong relationship in the statistical study between institutions and cooperation can be challenged by arguing that “states make their decisions on sanctions without regard to any organization constraints and then turn to institutions to ratify those decisions. In the cases, I show [via process-tracing] that institutional calls for sanctions actually have an impact on state behavior.”616
It should be noted, finally, that Martin recognizes that equifinality operated; different causal processes produced cooperation. Only through close inspection of the decision-making chain through process-tracing in the case studies, Martin suggests, would it be possible to distinguish one causal process from the other.
STEVEN WEBER, COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL. PRINCETON, N.J.: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1991.
Weber’s research objective emerged from his identification of a theoretical puzzle. Commenting on Robert Axelrod’s formal deductive theory, which holds that cooperation in a prisoner ’s dilemma situation is possible under certain conditions, Weber posits that even when Axelrod’s conditions are present cooperation does not always occur. The puzzle is to explain such anomalous outcomes as well as successes.
This research objective is pursued by delimiting the total universe of arms control cases to a well-defined subclass: major U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitations. The research strategy extends Axelrod’s theory in an empirical direction; process-tracing is employed to force the theory to confront a set of historical cases in which Weber identifies the “processes or causal paths through which strategies influence outcomes.” 617 Weber feels that it is necessary to go beyond Axelrod’s formal deductive theory and go into the black boxes of U.S. and Soviet decision-making and strategic interaction between them. For this purpose Weber adds independent variables—in particular, those specifying variants of strategy employed by the United States in these cases.
Weber’s research strategy is implemented in an ingenious way—he selects three cases that fulfill Axelrod’s structural conditions for cooperation, only one of which resulted in cooperation. Hence, the case selection captures the paradox that motivated the study and offers an opportunity, indeed a need, to explain the variance in outcomes. The research objective and research strategy required Weber to select cases based on variation in the outcome of the dependent variable (thus departing from the general injunction of some methodologists not to do so).
The three cases are the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) negotiation, which ended in U.S.-Soviet cooperation; the Anti-Satellite Missile (ASAT) in which the two sides achieved a partially cooperative arrangement that deteriorated over time; and the Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) negotiation, in which despite the presence of Axelrod’s conditions, the two sides failed to achieve a cooperative outcome.
Put simply, Weber selected cases in which the independent variables highlighted by Axelrod’s conditions for cooperation were present—and are held constant for the three cases—while the outcome of the dependent variable (cooperation or lack of it) varies. Thus, the three cases present a challenge to Axelrod’s theory, and Weber attempts to show how that theory might benefit from elaboration and refinement. Weber’s chief addition to the theory is to introduce three variants of strategy employed by the United States in an effort to achieve an acceptable cooperative outcome. Weber employs process-tracing to identify the causal paths through which variations in strategy