Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [164]
In this book, Vertzberger builds on his previous work to develop a sociocognitive approach to decision-making as an alternative to the parsimonious way in which rational choice theory attempts to deal with risk behavior and choice. His approach integrates individual-level variables (e.g., belief system, operational code, personality attributes), social-level variables (e.g., group dynamics and organizational structure), and cultural-level variables (e.g., cultural-societal attributes and norms). He argues that to provide “a comprehensive explanation of the multiple causal influences on risk judgment and preferences, the theoretical analysis has to be multivariate and interdisciplinary.” He also emphasizes that because decisions to accept risk or to avoid it are subject to equifinality—that is, similar choices can result from different causal paths—a credible theoretical analysis of risk taking should map the spectrum of alternative patterns rather than unrealistically invoking the principles of parsimony and attempting to identify a single path.627
The major objective of the study is to examine how risk perceptions and risk-taking preferences evolve in the decision-making process and affect choice. Following the format of the structured, focused method, Vertzberger maps out three sets of questions to address in developing a deductive model and then employing process-tracing in a detailed analysis of five cases “in order to test, expand, and modify the [initial] deductive theoretical analyses of risk taking and intervention.”628
Five cases were chosen to provide “a quasi-controlled experiment with history that allows for careful manipulation and observation of the main dependent and independent variables—intervention and risk.”629 To this end, the author chose three cases that represent low-to-moderate-risk decisions (the U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989 and Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968), and two cases that represent high-risk decisions (U.S. intervention in Vietnam in 1964-1968 and Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982-1983). The labeling of these cases is based on the decision-makers’ perceptions as inferred from an analysis of historical facts and counterfactuals.630
Varying the levels of perceived risk enables the author to observe the effect of changing levels of risk on the process and quality of intervention decisions.631 The author addresses the question of the generalizability of the study’s findings and offers several qualifying comments. He believes that the study findings are “plausible rather than definitive” in effect, characterizing his study as a plausibility probe.
Vertzberger emphasizes that this book “is first and foremost about how judgment of risk is formed and how choice among risk-taking preferences is made.”632 He provides a quite useful discussion of previous research on military intervention, which leaves a gap that his study attempts to fill.633
JACK S. LEVY, “THE ROLE OF CRISIS MISMANAGEMENT IN THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I,” IN ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, ED., AVOIDING WAR: PROBLEMSOFCRISISMANAGEMENT. BOULDER: WESTVIEW PRESS, 1991, PP. 62-117.
This study illustrates how elements of a rational choice approach can be used with other theories to develop a rounded, more comprehensive explanation of complex events.634 Complexity in this case took the form of interactions among six major actors at a number of key “decision points” during the six weeks leading up to World War I. Additional complexity stemmed from the fact that during this period political leaders in the six states had to consider the relative desirability of a peaceful settlement and different kinds of war, based on their assessment of the likely outcomes of each. These were a negotiated peace (NP), based on significant but not unconditional Serbian concessions; a localized war (LW) in the Balkans between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; a continental