Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [190]
133
See, respectively, Kevin Wang and James Lee Ray, “Beginners and Winners: The Fate of Initiators of Interstate Wars Involving Great Powers Since 1495,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 139-154; Robert Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Peterson, “How Democracies Differ”; and Ray, Democracies and International Conflict.
134
Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” pp. 87-125; and José Varela Ortega, “Aftermath of Splendid Disaster: Spanish Politics Before and After the Spanish-American War of 1898,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1980), pp. 317-344.
135
Ray, Democracies and International Conflict; Peterson, “How Democracies Differ;” and Layne, “Kant or Cant.”
136
Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, University Press, 1996).
137
Ray, Democracies and International Conflict.
138
Russett, “Correspondence: The Democratic Peace.”
139
Spiro, “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace.”
140
Elman, ed., Paths to Peace, pp. 192-197.
141
Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Additional formal modeling work relevant to the interdemocratic peace includes Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), pp. 623-638; and George W. Downs and David Rocke, “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 362-380. For a discussion of these works and other applications of formal models to security studies, see Andrew Kydd, “The Art of Shaler Modeling Game Theory and Security Studies,” in Detlef F. Sprinz ans Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds, Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), pp. 344-366.
142
Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 3-18.
143
Ibid., p. 158.
144
Ibid., pp. 169-170.
145
Ibid., p. 163.
146
Ibid., pp. 241-242. Schultz points out in a footnote, without elaboration, that his model predicts that such deterrence failures by united democracies should not happen, but that a different model he used in earlier work allows for the possibility of resistance against united democracies (note 1, p. 242); the referenced work is Kenneth A. Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (December 1998), pp. 829-844.
147
Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).
148
William Hoeft, “Explaining Interdemocratic Peace.”
149
Elman, Paths to Peace, pp. 38-39.
150
Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” pp. 87-125.
151
This discussion draws upon earlier publications: Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68; Alexander L. George, “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior,” in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 95-124; and Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith, eds., Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 21-58.
An extension of structured, focused comparison is proposed