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333

Campbell and Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Design for Research. For a good example, see James Lee Ray, Democracies and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 158-200.

334

For a more detailed summary of Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), see the Appendix, “Studies That Illustrate Research Design.”

335

An important contribution to explicating standards for counterfactual analysis is Tetlock and Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics. These authors and most of the contributors to their volume take a sober view regarding the feasibility of plausible counterfactuals. At one point the editors state that “we seem to be stuck with quite literally a third-rate method” (p. 37). They highlight difficult-to-meet criteria for valid counterfactuals and urge analysts to be clearer and stricter in efforts to employ counterfactuals. See also Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997); Deborah Welch Larson’s study of missed opportunities during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, Anatomy of Distrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Bruce Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999). We have benefited from discussions about counterfactuals with Aaron Belkin and Deborah Larson.

336

James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 169-195. Cited material is from p. 194. In a subsequent essay, Fearon takes a very sober view regarding the feasibility of developing acceptable counterfactual analysis for most social science cases. James D. Fearon, “Causes and Counterfactuals in Social Science,” in Tetlock and Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, pp. 65-67.

337

Tetlock and Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics, does not appear to give sufficient emphasis to this requirement.

338

King, Keohane, Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 199-207.

339

Most of these critical reviews and additional commentary are republished in Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004). Charles Ragin states that Part One, “Diversity-Oriented Research,” of his book, Fuzzy-Set Social Science, is a rebuttal of Designing Social Inquiry.

340

King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 91.

341

Ibid.

342

Ibid.; emphasis in original.

343

Ibid., pp. 91-92.

344

Ibid., p. 93.

345

Ibid., pp. 93-94.

346

Ibid., pp. 199-206.

347

Ibid., p. 204.

348

Ibid., p. 205.

349

These are Seymour Martin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Comparative and Historical Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963); David Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); and Atul Kohli, The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

350

King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 206.

351

Ibid., pp. 213-217.

352

Ibid., p. 215.

353

Ibid., p. 216.

354

Ibid., p. 217.

355

Ibid., p. 218. Designing Social Inquiry also notes (pp. 219-220) that an alternative to doing so is to work with subunits of the phenomenon in question.

356

Ibid., p. 217.

357

Ibid., p. 218.

358

Ibid., p. 224.

359

Ibid., p. 225.

360

Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science, p. 206.

361

King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, p. 30; emphasis added.

362

Ibid., p. 24. In his comment on King, Keohane,