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in a spheres-of-influence agreement, a withdrawal of the United States from Europe in favor of a hemispheric “Fortress America” security policy, a relatively benign collaborative-competitive relationship, a cold war, or World War III. These are highly different outcomes of a very consequential nature. Other variables, not encompassed by structural-realist theory, would have to be considered to try to predict or explain which of these outcomes would occur. We are not criticizing the structural-realist theory for being unable to do more than it was able to do. Structural-realist theory is not designed to make highly specific predictions.

391

This illustrates the observation made in Chapter 4 that a causal relationship may be sensitive to the level of concreteness or abstraction with which the investigator defines the value and variance of the dependent variable. To extend our hypothetical example further, let us assume that the action XX taken by the first actor is coupled with his displaying a particular image of the opponent that views the second actor as a limited adversary who is interested in moderating conflict and in striving for accommodations. In certain types of situations, this will encourage the second actor to choose a conciliatory response of some kind. What type of conciliatory response he chooses will be influenced by other beliefs that further refine his general propensity for making a conciliatory response. For example, the second actor’s belief regarding the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interest may come into play, influencing him to prefer option A rather than option B, C, or D. In other words, a combination of several beliefs may further narrow his choice propensities. (Other combinations, of course, are also possible.)

392

This brief discussion draws on the fuller discussion in Alexander L. George, “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior: The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System,” in Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979).

393

Stephen G. Walker, “The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger’s Operational Code and the Vietnam War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1977), pp. 129-168. More recently, Walker has written a much expanded version of this article in which he undertakes a two-sided analysis of the interaction between the United States and Vietnam whereas his earlier study looked only at the effect of Kissinger’s beliefs on U.S. policy. Stephen G. Walker, “The Management and Resolution of Conflict in a ‛Single’ Case,” in Zeev Maoz et al., eds., Multiple Paths to Knowledge (forthcoming).

394

Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969).

395

Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War.

396

Ibid., p. 62.

397

Ibid., p. 139.

398

Ibid., p. 190.

399

In otherwise highly favorable reviews of Khong’s book, Deborah Larson and Jack Levy both suggest that a broader research design that considered additional explanatory variables would have been useful. Larson notes that Khong’s analysis of U.S. decisions in the Vietnam War lacks “explanatory breadth.” That is, “focusing solely on the admittedly important decisions of February and July 1965 overlooks … international and domestic conditions.” Continuing, she notes, “American involvement in Vietnam was determined by many causal factors, including the bipolar distribution of power, concern for the credibility of extended deterrence, memories of the anti-Communist hysteria that followed the loss of China, and belief in the domino theory.” Deborah Welch Larson, American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 812-813. We note that Khong would most likely agree with Larson’s point, but observe that his study did not embrace the broader objective of explaining “American involvement in Vietnam.” Levy’s incisive explication and commentary on Khong’s study is also coupled with a suggestion of a broader research design. See Jack S. Levy, “Learning from