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By Root 864 0

via reference to law-like statements of regularity. We outline as an alternative the use of theories about causal mechanisms to explain cases, and we address several challenges in defining causal mechanisms and distinguishing their epistemology from that of using laws to explain cases. Finally, we discuss the close connection between the epistemology of causal mechanisms and the methodology of process-tracing, which allows close inspection of the observable implications of theorized causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases. We conclude that both process-tracing and typological theorizing are powerful methods for testing theories about causal mechanisms in individual cases and developing contingent generalizations about the conditions under which these mechanisms, and conjunctions of different mechanisms, operate in particular ways in specified contexts.

How Does the Philosophy of the Social Sciences Differ From That of the Physical Sciences?

A key difference between the physical sciences, which have shaped much of the philosophy of science, and the social sciences is that human agents are reflective—that is, they contemplate, anticipate, and can work to change their social and material environments and they have long-term intentions as well as immediate desires or wants. These observations have led to what has been termed the constructivist approach to international relations.250 This approach, in part a reaction to the structuralist modern variants of realpolitik theories of international relations, emphasizes that structures are social as well as material, and that agents and structures are mutually constitutive. In other words, social and material environments both socialize and constrain individuals and enable them to take actions intelligible to others, including actions that intentionally change social norms and material circumstances. As David Dessler has persuasively argued, this constructivist ontology entirely encompasses structuralist ontologies because it takes into account social and material structures as well as the intended and unintended consequences of social interaction.251 Agent-centered change is not unique to human agents—living beings from microbes to mammals can affect their environments—but intentional change is unique to human agents or nearly so.

The reflexivity of human agents suggests that the postmodern and hermeneutic critiques of the successors of the positivist tradition in the philosophy of science are more relevant in the social than in the physical sciences. Postmodernists emphasize that language—a key medium of human interaction—is open to multiple interpretations, thus hampering any aspiration toward definitive explanatory theories. Hermeneuticists argue that the study of social phenomena cannot be independent of these phenomena because researchers are socialized into certain conceptions of science and society. Moreover, the results of research can change the behavior being studied; a new theory of the relationship between inflation and unemployment, for example, might lead investors and employers to change their behavior in ways that make the theory less valid. More generally, the very nature of the objects under study can change, as in the emergence of capitalism or state sovereignty. In short, there are no immutable foundational truths in social life.

Thus, most social generalizations are necessarily contingent and time-bound, or conditioned by ideas and institutions that hold only for finite periods; yet we need not concede fully to the postmodernist or hermeneutic critiques of social theorizing. Observation is theory-laden, but it is not theory-determined. Evidence can surprise us and force us to revise our theories and explanations. Language is subject to multiple interpretations, but not infinite ones, and sometimes it is fairly unambiguous. Moreover, important social structures like sovereignty or capitalism clearly are sufficiently recursive and long-lived that recognizable behavioral patterns can usefully be theorized upon for meaningful periods of time.