Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [78]
We agree with Elster on the usefulness of thinking in terms of causal mechanisms, but in our view his conclusion on the impossibility of modeling the conditions under which they operate is too pessimistic. As we argue in Chapter 11, typological theories provide a way to model complex interactions or causal mechanisms by including recurrent combinations of hypothesized mechanisms as distinct types or configurations.290 In this regard, typological theories resemble the middle-range theories that Robert Merton advocated, situated as they are between the microlevel of individual causal mechanisms and the highly abstract level of general theories. Moreover, while complexity is in our view common in social phenomena, and many scholars are interested in causal mechanisms as vehicles of explanation because they can accommodate complexity, some causal mechanisms may be rather simple and general in character. Thus, complexity is not intrinsic to the definition of causal mechanisms, even though mechanisms operate in historical contexts that are often complex and mechanism-oriented theories can accommodate contingency or complexity.
Causal Mechanisms, Process-Tracing, and Historical Explanation
Several scholars interested in explanation via causal mechanisms have noted the relationship between such explanations and the methodology of process-tracing.291 We elaborate on this relationship in Chapter 10. Briefly, process-tracing is one means of attempting to get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind observed phenomena.292 Process-tracing attempts to empirically establish the posited intervening variables and implications that should be true in a case if a particular explanation of that case is true. Theories or models of causal mechanisms must undergird each step of a hypothesized causal process for that process to constitute a historical explanation of the case.
As David Dessler has argued, there are two approaches to the explanation of events: a generalizing strategy (to show the event as an instance of a certain type of event) and particularization (detailing the sequence of happenings leading up to an event, without necessarily placing it in a larger class). The historical explanation relies on laws to explain each step toward a historical outcome, but the laws are used in piecemeal fashion at each step of the path leading to the outcome. Dessler notes that much explanatory progress in the social sciences, and also in physical and medical sciences, consists of improving historical as well as theoretical explanations. Progress in historical explanation consists of “using existing theories and laws and acquiring a more precise characterization of the initial conditions and the event itself.”293
At the same time, improved historical explanations help to improve theories. As we discuss in Chapter 6, we may change our theories or limit their scope if, for example, we find that they do not explain a most-likely case that they should easily be able to explain. The inductive side of process-tracing can also contribute to the development of general theories on the mechanisms underlying the processes observed in a case.294 Additionally, our approach of combining typological theorizing with process-tracing is an attempt to make use of both generalizing and particularizing explanations, placing cases as instances of a class of events while also giving detailed historical explanations of each case. Case study researchers often ask the two basic questions Dessler identifies: “What is this a case of?” and “From what historical pathway did this event emerge?”
Conclusion
The philosophical issues raised in this chapter have important and direct implications for the practice of the qualitative research