Catastrophe - Dick Morris [98]
Think about it: Why do we require quarterly and annual lobbying disclosure? So that we can monitor several things: who’s trying to influence the people we elected to represent us; how much they’re being paid to wield their influence over the legislative process; and what it is they’re trying to achieve. But as inadequate as the lobbying disclosure requirements are—and they certainly are—the stealth lobbyists get around even those minimal legal requirements.
They’ve figured out how to game the system, and they’ve made it legal. For example, you’re technically not a lobbyist if you devote less than 20 percent of your total working time on a client’s matters to lobbying activities. In other words, you can engage in covered lobbying activities all you like—as long as you do so for only 19 percent of the time spent on the client’s work.
Should serious regulation of lobbyists depend on the amount of time they spend on lobbying? If you’re engaged in lobbying activities at all, you’re a lobbyist and you should be regulated like one. End of story.
Why did the lobbying industry push for this crazy distinction? For one simple reason: because registered lobbyists are required to disclose what they are working on, who hired them, and how much they’re being paid.
Unlike lobbyists, “strategic advisers” and “government relations consultants” keep their work secret. For them—and their clients—that’s a big plus. Many corporate clients would prefer that no one know about the millions they spend to defeat health care reforms, for example, or to get an earmark passed that will benefit their business. That’s where “strategic advisers” come in handy: as stealth lobbyists, they’re very effective in producing results for their clients while keeping things conveniently under the radar.
Another reason these lobbyists want to avoid being regulated is the legal prohibition on lobbying for two years after leaving government service. Under our current lobbying regulations, former senators, cabinet members, and assistant secretaries, to mention just a few, are forbidden to lobby their colleagues for two years after leaving their influential government jobs. That’s a sensible provision, designed to prevent government officials from cutting last-minute deals before leaving office in exchange for future work or favors and to prevent even the perception of conflicts of interest. But the folks in Washington have figured a way around it: under today’s loose standards, all a departing official needs to do is join a lobbying firm and call himself an “adviser.” Like cockroaches that develop immunity to every new roach spray, lobbyists find their way out of the regulatory scheme without missing a step.
Who are these clever stealth lobbyists? You’ll recognize many of them. They’re former everythings: senators, congressmen, even a former president (Bill Clinton is one stealth lobbyist who doesn’t hesitate to pick up the phone and call Democratic leaders to push the programs that are important to groups that are paying him). Some are relatives of prominent politicians, such as Ted Kennedy, Jr. Others are close former presidential campaign operatives who want to preserve the option of joining the executive branch at a later date. Senate majority leaders are especially popular stealth lobbyists. Of the last four Senate majority leaders, three are stealth lobbyists: Tom Daschle, George Mitchell, and Trent Lott. The fourth, Bob Dole, is a full-fledged registered lobbyist. All four now work for lobbying firms. While it’s not illegal, these “advisers” should all have to disclose their clients and the issues that they “advise” them about getting through Congress.
Former House leaders are doing well under this system, too—among them former majority leaders Richard Gephart and Dick Armey, both registered lobbyists.
It’s obvious that leadership positions in Congress are good training spots for both lobbyists and stealth lobbyists. That’s where they develop their skills—and, apparently, find their future clients. The ones