China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [0]
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Abbreviations
Introduction
ONE - Why Transitions Get Trapped: A Theoretical Framework
Economic Development and Political Change
Theories of Economic Reform
Gradualism, Chinese Style
Why No Autocracy Has Opted for the Big Bang
A Question of the State: Developmental or Predatory
The Theory of the Predatory State
Why Decentralized Predation May Emerge during Transition
TWO - Democratizing China?
Political Reform: The Ruling Elites’ Views
Political Reform According to Deng Xiaoping
Political Reform: A Liberal Alternative
Political Reform: Content, Goals, and Dilemmas
Political Reform: A Stillborn Plan
Institutional Reforms: Promise and Disappointment
Legislative Output
Constitutional Oversight Power
Power of Appointment and Removal
Organizational Growth
Legal Reform
Politicization of the Courts and Lack of Judicial Independence
Fragmentation of Judicial Authority
Village Elections
Illiberal Adaptation
Selective Repression
Containing Social Unrest
Responding to the Information Revolution
Co-optation
The Co-optation of the Intelligentsia
The Co-optation of Private Entrepreneurs
THREE - Rent Protection and Dissipation: The Dark Side of Gradualism
The Grain Procurement System
The Evolution of the Grain Procurement System
Analysis
The Telecom Service Sector
Monopoly and State Control
Analysis
The Banking Sector
Banking Reform since 1979
SCBs’ Dominance and Performance
Poor Governance and Corruption
Analysis
The Economic Costs of Gradualism
How Marketized Is the Chinese Economy?
SOEs’ Share of Economic Output and Employment
The State’s Influence in Commodities and Factor Markets
Fragmentation of Domestic Markets
International Comparisons
FOUR - Transforming the State: From Developmental to Predatory
The Institutional Dynamics of Decentralized Predation
Corruption and Decentralization of Predation
The Growing Size of the Chinese State
Decentralization of Property Rights
Administrative Decentralization and Predation
Declining Monitoring Capability
Crime and Punishment
New Exit Options
Declining Ideological and Institutional Norms
Collusion and the Emergence of Local Mafia States
FIVE - China’s Mounting Governance Deficits
Governance Deficits and State Incapacitation
Public and Workplace Safety
Education
Public Health
Environmental Degradation
Crisis in Rural Public Finance
Erosion of the CCP’s Mobilization Capacity
Economic Reform and the CCP’s Organizational Decline
Internal Corruption
Mass Disenchantment with the CCP
Rising Tensions Between the State and Society
Rural Decay and Discontent
The Unemployment Challenge
The Institutional Breakdown
Conclusion
Appendix: - Reported Cases of Local Mafia States
Notes
Acknowledgements
Index
Copyright © 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
First Harvard University Press paperback edition, 2008
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pei, Minxin.
China’s trapped transition : the limits of developmental autocracy / Minxin Pei.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-674-02195-2 (cloth: alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-674-02754-1 (pbk.)
1. Democracy—China. 2. China—Politics and government—1976-2002-
3. China—Economic policy—1976-2000. 4. China—Economic policy—2000—I. Title
JQ1516.P44 2006
320.951—dc22
2005052762
To Samuel P. Huntington
Abbreviations
Introduction
THE ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION DRIVE that China launched at the end of the 1970s ranks as one of the most dramatic episodes of social and economic transformation in history. This process occurred in a unique political and economic context: a simultaneous transition from a state-socialist economic system and a quasi-totalitarian political system. Despite temporary setbacks, brief periods of high political