China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [32]
Although Zhao thought it was premature to hold direct elections for the NPC, he suggested that competitive elections for the deputies to the provincial People’s Congress should be held. He saw no reason why “we cannot open up the elections for the chairman, vice chairmen, provincial governor, and vice governors.” Bao shared the same view and insisted that elections could increase political accountability for cadres, and that the democratic elections of government officials would be the prerequisite for instituting “democracy in other arcas.”26
Even among the liberal-leaning senior officials, there were divergent views about the ultimate goal of political reform. Zhao, for example, believed that such reform would strengthen the party and enable it to maintain power. He pointed out, “we must solve not the problem of whether the CCP will rule, but how it will rule.” Hu Qili expressed the same thinking even more explicitly. “The goal for us is to have it both ways. We want both a high level of democracy and a high level of efficiency. The first and foremost principle is to maintain the party’s leadership and improve it. Political reform must strengthen the authority of the party, not undermine it.”27
Other participants in the discussions thought differently, however. Liao Gailong, an eminent party historian, envisioned a set of goals that were more radical. He said that political reform should lead to judicial independence and equality under law; a more powerful role of the NPC; an autonomous civil society; the separation of the party from the state; and inner-party democracy.28 Bao presented perhaps the most articulate argument on the objectives of political reform and a strategy to accomplish them. The short-term goal of political reform was institutionalization (zhiduhua). The long-term goal was democratization. Institutionalization, mainly through restructuring the party’s leadership system and the administrative system of the government, would create a more pluralist, though not necessarily democratic, system of interest representation under the current political order. Introducing inner-party democracy would create favorable conditions for political dcmocracy. Additionally, with legal reforms, China could build “a normal political order.”29
It was also clear from the debate among the Chinese elites in the late 1980s that they were acutely aware of the risks and dilemmas of experimenting with political reform. First, they were worried about both an unsustainable status quo and the possibility that the existing system was too fragile to withstand reform, especially at the initial stage. Zhao cautioned, “If the status quo is not changed, it won’t do; but if the steps are too big, that won’t do either. To ensure the smooth and healthy process of democratization, no problem must occur at the beginning. If there is a problem, we must step back.”30
The second practical dilemma for the liberals was how to deal with the difficulties created by institutional checks and balances that would inevitably result from the reforms. Zhao openly worried about how strengthening the NPC would reduce the party’s control and the government’s ability to make policy. “If the