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its bloody aftermath had turned the Chinese leadership toward a more conservative direction. In the context of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it would be hard to envision the CCP leadership—besieged, insecure, and isolated—to have favored a strategy of political liberalization for survival. In addition, the Tiananmen crisis gravely weakened the liberal wing inside the CCP, as top leaders such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili were purged. Needless to say, the limited political reform program they had planned to implement never came to fruition. Had the crisis been resolved peacefully and the liberal leaders triumphed, China’s post-1989 history would have been different, and it most probably would have made more progress in political liberalization. Even then, however, the strong conservative forces within the CCP, Deng’s own hostility toward democracy (if he himself had retained power under this scenario), and the CCP’s institutional interest in maintaining its political monopoly would have made a dramatic democratic breakthrough unlikely, if not impossible.

This also appears to be the assessment of Zhao Ziyang. When a friend asked Zhao in 2004 whether he “could have pushed political reform had,June 4 not occurred,” Zhao reportedly paused and then said he could not because he “did not have enough power.” Because “there was such a large government, there was such a huge number of cadres, and so many people’s interests were involved, I did not have the power,” Zhao repeated. The only person who had the power and ability to do so, said Zhao, was Deng himself. But while Dcng would give free reign to economic reforms, he was “very vigilant against the reform of the political system,” Zhao commented. When pressed to elaborate further what he would have done had June 4 not happened, Zhao said that he “would have practiced enlightened politics. I had thought about allowing democratic parties to grow... If I were to have started political reform, I would have pushed democratic politics slowly.”35 Even without Tiananmen, China would have been much more liberal than it is today, but not necessarily as fully democratic as one might hope.

Institutional Reforms: Promise and Disappointment

The emergence of the NPC and, to a lesser extent, Local People’s Congresses (LPCs), as major actors in decision making in China in the reform cra have been hailed by many scholars as a sign of political institutionalization or even pluralization.36 Based on Western experience, a stronger legislature can constrain the power of the executive branch and create institutional checks and balances conducive to democracy and the rule of law. Yet, in a political system dominated by the CCP, China’s legislative branch has long been regarded as no more than a rubber stamp, whose sole function is to provide pro forma legitimacy for the decisions already made by the ruling party.37 Therefore, the extent to which the NPC and LPCs assert their constitutional authority and influence in decision making should be a key measurement of political reform. This section will assess the institutional development and political empowerment of the NPC and LPCs.

The growth of the NPC as one of the most important political institutions in China has been extensively documented. But major studies of the growth of the NPC reached different conclusions regarding the institution’s influence during the reform era. In his study of the institutional development of the NPC during the 1980s, Kevin O’Brien argues that NPC reforms during the decade did little to increase competition or institutionalize responsiveness. Through procedural rationalization, the legislators of the NPC sought to improve one-party rule, instead of pursuing genuine political liberalization. As a result, NPC reforms were limited to the organizational changes in the NPC that strengthened the Standing Committee, increased specialization and procedural regularity, and improved internal organization.38

In a major study of the passage