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by the indiscriminate use of mass terror in their exercise of power, developmental autocracies tend to be more selective and discriminating in the repression of their political opponents. Indeed, the measurable decline in political repression usually marks the transition from a totalitarian regime to an authoritarian one in general, and to a developmental autocracy in particular.137 In theory, the replacement of mass terror by selective repression is not hard to explain. Mass terror is politically and economically costly. Even the most brutal totalitarian regimes—such as the former Soviet Union under Stalin and China during Mao’s Cultural Revolution—cannot sustain the reign of mass terror indefinitely.

For developmental autocracies, a strategy of selective repression offers more advantages. It enables the rulers to focus only on those political opponents who are determined to challenge their political monopoly, while allowing those tolerant of the regime’s rule a sufficient degree of personal and property security. Domestically, such a strategy alienates fewer people and may even help isolate and weaken the regime’s opponents. Selective repression is also less frightening to foreign and domestic investors than mass terror. Although human rights concerns do not always dictate investment decisions, there appears to be a limit to private investors’ tolerance of brutality. Historically, few totalitarian regimes have been successful in attracting foreign or domestic private investment because such regimes cannot provide any credible commitment to the personal and property security of the investors.

In the case of China, selective repression replaced mass terror as soon as Deng’s economic reforms began. The post-Mao regime immediately ended class struggle, greatly curtailed the scope of repression, and politically rehabilitated millions who had suffered brutally under Mao’s rule. The level of repression fell dramatically, as measured by the number of political prisoners.138 The post-Mao regime’s use of selective repression grew increasingly sophisticated as well, especially in the 1990s. Instead of simply brutalizing its opponents through incarceration or worse, the state security apparatus has skillfully employed a wide range of tactics to intimidate, control, and neutralize key political activists. Many leading dissidents were offered a stark choice: either exile or long prison terms. Many, such as Wei Jingsheng, Wang Juntao, and Wang Dan, were forced into exile in the United States. This tactic has successfully decapitated China’s fledgling dissident movement and even allowed China’s government to deflect international criticisms of its human rights practices by timing the release and exile of key dissidents to important events, such as the annual U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva and visits to China by Western leaders.

To prevent the emergence of organized opposition, the security apparatus has also established an extensive network of informants, especially on university campuses and research institutes. These informers receive monthly stipends in exchange for reporting campus political activities to the secret police. In its annual report for 2001, the provincial public security department of Jiangxi disclosed that it recruited sixty-five informants (qingbao xinxi lianluoyuan) in fifty SOEs and nonprofit institutions, as well as in fifteen institutions of higher education and “cultural units.” These informants collected 256 pieces of information and enabled the authorities effectively to deal with a dozen “unexpected incidents.”139

Containing Social Unrest

The skillful application of selective repression can also be seen in the regime’s handling of the growing social unrest in the countryside and urban areas. In the 1990s, as the number of collective protests increased rapidly as the result of layoffs at bankrupt SOEs and rural tax revolts, the public security apparatus developed and employed effective methods to contain these protests, preventing them from precipitating a political chain reaction