Chosen Soldier - Dick Couch [198]
There is a final issue, and it has nothing to do with rules of engagement or conventional-force application versus special operations—it’s an in-house SOF issue. This is the emphasis within the special operations community regarding unilateral, direct-action operations as opposed to a commitment to train the locals. In a broad sense, both can be seen as counterinsurgency measures. The SOF proponents of direct action feel that if you find and kill enough senior-level insurgents, then the insurgent gears will grind to a halt and buy us the time to win local hearts and minds. They’re trying to cut the head off the snake, and they did with the targeting and elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Those who practice foreign internal defense advocate a by, with, and through approach—that the training of local soldiers and policemen should be a priority. The locals, once trained and fielded, are a whole lot better at the job than we are. Having done the former, albeit a long time ago, and seen the latter, I’m inclined to believe that training the locals to do the job is better—way better. It’s a matter of preventive medicine or surgery. And while developing the language and cross-cultural skills is more difficult and more time consuming than purely tactical, behind-the-gun skills, it’s what really sets the special operator apart from his conventional counterpart. What I’m saying here is that within special operations, we need more focus on foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency—these are the essential skills.
This applies not just to Special Forces, but to our Rangers and SEALs as well. This in-house attention and concentration is important now, as we deal with this insurgency, and as we prepare for the next one. It’s the way our enemies will fight.
There’s an old military adage that we usually fight the current war with the tactics of the last war. This is because wars supposedly change, and the military force that once proved effective is out of date—obsolete. We came into this war woefully unprepared to deal with an insurgent enemy; we simply lacked counterinsurgency capability in our force structure. In that regard, we learned little from Vietnam. I predict that the next war, or, better said, the next campaign in this one—the Regional War Against Islamic Extremists—will look a whole lot like this one. To be as unprepared as we were, especially with the decision to go into Iraq, was unfortunate. To be unprepared the next time, in the context of those we send into harm’s way, will be criminal.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND MILITARY NOMENCLATURE
1st SWTG
1st Special Warfare Training Group
18 Series military occupational specialties (MOS):
18 Alpha (18A)
Detachment commander
180 Alpha (180A)
Assistant detachment commander
18 Bravo (18B)
Weapons sergeant
18 Charlie (18C)
Engineering sergeant
18 Delta (18D)
Medical sergeant/combat medic
18 Echo (18E)
Communications sergeant
18 Foxtrot (18F)
Intelligence sergeant/18 Fox
18 Zulu (18Z)
Team sergeant/operations sergeant
APFT
Army Physical Fitness Test
ATL
Adaptive Thinking and Leadership
BDU
Battle dress utility (camouflage uniform)
BNCOC
Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course
COIN
Counterinsurgency
DA
Direct action
DZ
Drop zone
EPW
Enemy prisoner of war
FID
Foreign internal defense
FOB
Forward operating base
Gs
Guerrillas
GPS
Global Positioning System
HALO
High-altitude