Chosen Soldier - Dick Couch [27]
This perfect storm of quality training, quality input, and urgent need does not exist with the other major SOF ground components. Navy SEALs, who have come ashore to become ground SOF players in this fight, are still made the old-fashioned way—the training cadre takes sailors from boot camp and fresh Naval Academy ensigns and makes them into SEALs. There’s no Navy boot camp or shipboard experience that compares with Army infantry training, nor is there any fleet deployment that prepares a man for special operations that’s comparable with a tour in Iraq with the 82nd Airborne or the 3rd Infantry Division. SEAL training is difficult, perhaps more difficult on the pure pain-o-meter scale than Special Forces training. But the skill set of a Navy SEAL—in addition to his behind-the-gun proficiency, which is comparable to an SF soldier’s—requires maritime training. Over one-third of basic SEAL training is in-water training; ongoing maritime/ underwater certification and proficiency training also take a great deal of time. And the counterinsurgency skills, while being given more attention, are still not the focus of SEAL training nor a primary mission in their deployment rotations. Even the Rangers don’t enjoy this “storm” in the manner of Special Forces. Rangers are younger and don’t have to be trained to the same rigorous standard of Special Forces. Good as they are and as tough as they are, it’s still light-infantry work, and their duties don’t carry the language and cross-cultural requirements of their SF brothers. For all of these reasons, Special Forces have found themselves in a special place and circumstance, one that is unprecedented and one that may never happen again.
A final word about these soldiers who abandon their conventional units to try out for Special Forces. When they leave the 101st Airborne or the 3rd Infantry Division, they are, to some extent, breaking faith with that band of brothers. They’re saying, “I want to leave you and join them.” Put yourself in the shoes of a company first sergeant in the 82nd Airborne. His battalion’s just returned from deployment, and like any good first sergeant, he’s thinking about the next deployment—the veterans he’ll have with him and the new men he has to whip into shape to go back to the fight. Suddenly, three of his best sergeants inform him that they’re putting in for Special Forces training. Never mind that two of the three will return to his company after an unsuccessful try at SF selection, perhaps better for their experience. They want to leave. In his heart, the first sergeant knows these soldiers are following their dream and are motivated to better serve their country. Still, he can’t help but feel betrayed and a little resentful. For the officers, this resentment is deeper. For officers leaving the conventional fold, it borders on infidelity in marriage. In many cases, the officer who leaves for SFAS may well be the best company commander or the most capable staff officer in his battalion or regiment. The senior commanders who rely on these outstanding junior officers can’t help but feel a little betrayed. It’s my sense, given the deployed working relationships and intelligence-production value of the Special Forces detachments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the wall between SOF elements and the conventional military may not be as formidable as it once was.