Chosen Soldier - Dick Couch [5]
Special Forces candidates now train, sweat, and struggle over the same ground as those young men in the 13th, 17th, and 101st Airborne Divisions did some sixty-odd years ago—their grandfathers’ and great-grandfathers’ generation of warriors. As I followed this current generation of warriors over this hallowed ground, I felt the ghostly presence of those bands of brothers who became part of what we now call the Greatest Generation. And with a full measure of respect for those gallant men who helped save the world from fascism, I couldn’t help but wonder if the men whose training I was privileged to document will someday be remembered as saving the world from religious fanaticism. How will history judge them? Well, I hope, for I firmly believe they stand between us and those who have sworn to again bring terror to our land.
Before tackling the business of Special Forces and Special Forces training, we need first to take care of some organizational issues. When we refer to Special Forces, or SF, in this book, we are talking about Army Special Forces—the Green Berets. Quite often in the media, and even some military circles, they’re mistaken for special operations forces. There is a difference. Special operations forces, or SOF, refer collectively to the Army, Navy, Air Force, and, most recently, Marine Corps special operations components. Under the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, the United States Special Operations Command was created to take ownership of our military special operators. The command’s headquarters was located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. Not only did the new command take control of these SOF components, but it was also given the funding as well as the charter for special operations. Thus, the U.S. Special Operations Command became, in essence, a fifth service. Initially, the Marines elected not to join the new force. General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, now wants marines in the special operations mix.
Since its inception, the Special Operations Command has grown dramatically in size, funding, and the scope of its responsibilities. Yet it’s quite small when compared to the other services. Currently, the command has just over 53,000 personnel and its funding is just over $7 billion. In the context of a $400 billion–plus defense budget, this 2 percent piece of the military-funding pie may seem small for the force that Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has tapped to take the lead in the global war on terror. The U.S. Special Operations Command enjoys an efficient “tooth to tail” ratio of about two to one, which means there are two support personnel for every shooter/flyer/boat driver that goes downrange. For ground combat operations, the command has some 15,000 guns to put into this fight. With the need for ongoing training and some semblance of a family life, we’re lucky to keep 5,000 special operators on the ground in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere around the world. Not that many when compared to upwards of 160,000 military personnel that have been kept on deployment in the active theaters since the fall of Baghdad. Why so few people and so little money? It has to do with politics and the SOF Truths. First, the SOF Truths:
Humans are more important than hardware.
Quality is more important than quantity.
SOF cannot be mass-produced.
Competent SOF cannot be created after the emergency arises.
Basically, it takes time to make these guys. The training is long and expensive, and the attrition