Citizen Hughes - Michael Drosnin [107]
One of the candidates in whom Johnson had expressed a “personal interest” was his longtime crony John Connally, then running for governor of Texas. Maheu arranged a contribution to the Connally campaign through the Hughes Tool Company in Houston.
At the same time, Maheu had sought the then vice-president’s advice on a well-connected law firm to represent Hughes in the TWA litigation that was just beginning. Johnson was pleased to oblige. He recommended Arnold, Fortas & Porter, where his old friend and business associate Abe Fortas was then a senior partner. Hughes, of course, retained the firm.
Now, Johnson, still grateful for past favors, seemed ready to help the billionaire battle the bomb.
“He continued by telling Grant that if you had concern about the pending blast that was sufficient enough for him to have concern also,” Maheu reported, completing his account of the just-ended Oval Office parley. “In Grant’s presence he summoned AEC Chairman Seaborg to the White House. He informed Grant that Seaborg would have to prove to him conclusively that the blast was safe in every detail.”
At first elated, Hughes grew restive as the day wore on with no further word from the president. As evening approached, he became increasingly frantic, worried that Johnson would not read his letter, afraid that even if he did the AEC still might prevail.
“I wish you would call Sawyer and ask if he knows any way to find out if the President has actually read my letter and what his decision is and if he is going to do anything,” wrote the impatient recluse, certain that his masterpiece would have more impact than the former governor’s White House visit.
“The reason I ask is this: my letter contains a lot of material and data etc. which was not and is not known to Mr. Sawyer. On the other hand, when Sawyer arrived ahead of my letter and Johnson granted Sawyer an interview, he (Johnson) may have thought there was no need to read my letter since he had heard from Sawyer. We must find some way of persuading Johnson to read my letter now. It will do more for us than anybody can obtain through a meeting.”
Yet even as he put his faith in the inspired words he had written, Hughes became alarmed at the thought that his foes might gain the ear of the president.
“I am positive that my letter was very very effective, but the AEC has had a rebuttal period since my letter was digested, and I have had no opportunity to answer any claims they may have made,” he fretted.
“That is why I think we should discontinue being quite so bashful and risk the chance of finding we have made the first move,” he continued, eager to counter the bombers’ presumed backstairs lobbying.
“We must find out to whom this matter has been entrusted by the President. I am sure he has turned it over to one of his staff members. If we could make contact with such individual, I think we could make some exceedingly important suggestions: like how we dont seek glory of victory in this matter, and will be most happy to agree upon a press release (joint).”
In fact, Johnson had not delegated the matter to any single aide. Rather, he had taken personal charge of the bomb controversy and mobilized half the White House staff to deal with Hughes.
National Security Advisor Walt Rostow, AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg, and the president’s science director Donald Hornig were instructed to report on the substantive issues. Marvin Watson, his second-in-command Jim Jones, and Harry McPherson were assigned to coordinate the project and draft a reply to Hughes’s letter.
It was a measure of Hughes’s real power, the power of his myth, and perhaps the “solid memories” the two men shared, that his somewhat quirky last-minute appeal was taken so seriously by Johnson. But the president’s top advisers were united in opposing any delay of the scheduled nuclear blast.
Johnson returned from the King Olav dinner shortly before midnight to find their reports waiting. He sent Lady Bird to