Citizen Hughes - Michael Drosnin [120]
Deeming the joint venture too “candid” to reveal long-distance, Maheu submitted a written report to Hughes the next day: “The following reflects the suggestions and procedures set forth by the Vice-President. He feels we should have two objectives—(a) delay the future plans of these big blasts until (b) the propitious moment at which the Administration will urge that underground testing be added to the Ban Treaty. He pledges his support and that of the Administration.”
This private nuclear-disarmament pact was a real bargain. It would cost Hughes just $400,000. A hundred grand for Humphrey, and $300,000 more to fund an “independent study” by six White House—approved scientists, all known critics of the bomb tests.
“During this program, the Vice-President will work with us very closely and confidentially,” added Maheu. “He is anxious to get your reaction to the above-mentioned plan.”
Hughes reacted with sour impatience. He expected results for his money—not studies—and he was willing to pay well.
“You say: ‘What do you think of Humphries’ program?’ ” he wrote. “Bob, I am no expert at these things. If I were, we would not have to go to Humphries to start with. Any program is as good or as bad as what he can produce with it—I am certainly nobody to evaluate.
“My position is very simple. You know what we want to accomplish and you know our resources are unlimited. You will have to take it from there. I thought you were satisfied with the results of your trip to Denver.”
The disappointing Denver summit coincided with the opening of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, which gave Hughes a new idea about how he might more profitably use the presidential candidate he had just acquired.
He would send Humphrey to Paris.
Obviously the vice-president could no longer be trusted to handle his own campaign strategy. Hughes would have to plot it from the penthouse. In fact, he had in mind a ploy so bold and complicated that Humphrey would have to be kept in the dark until after he had completed his assigned mission.
For the rest of the nation, the burning issue of the 1968 election was the war in Vietnam. For Hughes it was the nuclear blasts in Nevada. It was now his inspiration to subtly link the two issues. If all went well, the unwitting Humphrey would emerge a hero, and Hughes would have peace with honor.
“It is just beginning to filter through to me.” Hughes wrote, “that now is the ideal moment for us to persuade Humphries or some other strong voice to come out and make a very inspiring tender of good wishes and felicitations to the just now convening delegates to the peace talks in Paris.
“In this first expression of the prayers of all mankind for the successful conclusion of the talks before the delegates and representatives now convening in Paris, I think it would be wise to omit any reference to the explosions in Nevada.
“However, the man we encourage to deliver this tender of good wishes and the prayers and hopes of all mankind, etc., etc., should be some one we can rely upon to deliver an impassioned plea for postponement of any explosion that may be scheduled. In other words, the man we select for this occasion should not know what we have in mind at all, and we should make sure he says nothing at this time to disclose what is being planned. However, it should be somebody we feel we control sufficiently so that, upon request a little later, he will be calculated to say what we may want him to say.
“This sounds more complicated than it is,” Hughes assured Maheu. “I think you, knowing my devious mind, are pretty well aware [of] what I am thinking about.”
Maheu knew very well what Hughes meant, but he still appeared to place more faith in the Denver plan his master had scorned. Humphrey did not embark for Paris. He seemed, however, to be doing quite well for Hughes in Washington.
So well, in fact, that the Atomic Energy Commission became increasingly alarmed that a Hughes panel of scientists, backed by the vice-president and packed with bomb-test foes, might well derail