Citizen Hughes - Michael Drosnin [175]
“If we emerge from the forthcoming election with the kind of strength we anticipate,” Hughes had confidently predicted during the 1968 campaign, “there will be no need for a negotiated settlement of this matter.”
Maheu had concurred: “I strongly suggest we call off this caper and take another look at it six months hence—after the elections.”
And, indeed, on January 17, 1969, as Richard Nixon prepared to move into the White House, the Justice Department did allow Hughes to acquire a sixth Las Vegas hotel, the Landmark. But the Landmark was a special case. Hughes was allowed to buy it only to save it from bankruptcy.
Otherwise, the antitrust blockade remained in force.
Now, early in 1970, Hughes prepared to test the new administration. He was eyeing the Dunes Hotel and Casino, a major resort on the Las Vegas Strip.
His own lawyer, Richard Gray, warned him it was a dangerous move. “While the Republican Attorney General might have a different view than his predecessor,” he wrote, “it is my humble opinion that the acquisition of any additional hotel would make us a prime target for antitrust action.”
Hughes decided to take the risk. Maheu had assured him that John Mitchell was an ally who could be reached through Rebozo, and that the new head of the antitrust division, Richard McLaren, was “our #1 choice.”
In January 1970, Richard Danner, who knew John Mitchell well from Nixon’s 1968 campaign, initiated a series of secret meetings with the new attorney general.
Neither McLaren nor anybody else from the antitrust division was invited. The Dunes deal would be handled informally, just between friends.
By February 26, after his second session with Mitchell, Danner had good news. Maheu relayed it to the penthouse. “Howard,” he wrote, “you will be pleased to know that Danner had a very pleasant and friendly meeting with the Attorney General who sends you his gratitude for all of your cooperation. He indicated that he could see no reason why we should not move forward with the purchase of the Dunes.”
A few days later, on March 9, the news was even better. “Howard,” reported Maheu, “it is our move to make on the Dunes. Danner had a long talk today with the Attorney General. He all but gave final approval today, but he wants the last say to emanate from the anti-trust division.”
Mitchell called in McLaren for the first time on March 12. He told his deputy he was “inclined to go along with Hughes’s purchase of the Dunes.” McLaren was not so inclined. He immediately informed Mitchell that it would violate antitrust laws, that approval of the deal would be “entirely inconsistent with the Justice Department’s earlier refusal to approve Hughes’s purchase of the Stardust.”
That kind of contrary attitude would eventually incur Nixon’s wrath. “I want something clearly understood,” the president later raged in a taped conversation. “And if it’s not understood, McLaren’s ass is to be out within one hour. I do not want him to run around prosecuting people, raising hell about conglomerates, stirring things up. Is that clear? I’d rather have him out anyway. I don’t like the son of a bitch.”
In the Hughes case, however, Nixon’s rage was not required. John Mitchell simply ignored his antitrust chief.
Just after noon on March 19, the attorney general again met secretly with Danner. He gave Hughes a green light on the Dunes deal. “We see no problem,” Mitchell told Hughes’s emissary. “Why don’t you go ahead.” There were no records kept. It was just a handshake deal.
The approval was a signal victory for Hughes. He had won a complete reversal of Justice policy, he had broken the antitrust blockade, he was finally free to expand his Nevada empire, to buy the rest of Las Vegas.
But the triumph meant nothing to Hughes. Nothing at all. It came just as a new megaton blast was announced in Nevada.
An atmosphere of terminal crisis gripped both the penthouse and the White House during Holy Week in 1970.
Howard Hughes learned